Property, Concepts, and Functions by Claeys, Eric R.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 1 Article 2
1-29-2019
Property, Concepts, and Functions
Eric R. Claeys
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, eric.claeys@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric R. Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions, 60 B.C.L. Rev. 1 (2019), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol60/iss1/2
  1 
PROPERTY, CONCEPTS, AND FUNCTIONS 
ERIC R. CLAEYS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3 
A. Property Metaphors ............................................................................................................... 3 
B. Two Concepts for Property .................................................................................................... 4 
C. Property, Artifacts, and Artifact Functions ............................................................................ 5 
D. Intended Contributions .......................................................................................................... 6 
E. Implications ........................................................................................................................... 6 
F. The Argument ......................................................................................................................... 9 
I. THREE PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY ........................................................................................... 9 
A. Bundle Views: Property as a Bundle of Rights ....................................................................... 9 
B. Exclusion Views: Property as a Castle ................................................................................ 10 
C. Progressive Property Views: Property as a Tree ................................................................. 12 
D. Four Test Cases ................................................................................................................... 14 
II. TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR PROPERTY CONCEPTS ........................................................................ 16 
A. Property and Ownership ...................................................................................................... 16 
B. Property and Functions ........................................................................................................ 19 
C. Implications ......................................................................................................................... 21 
D. A Way Forward ................................................................................................................... 22 
III. PROPERTY CONCEPTS AND WATER RIGHTS ............................................................................ 24 
A. Why Water Rights?............................................................................................................... 24 
B. Water Rights and Ditch Easements ...................................................................................... 25 
C. The Proprietary Character of Water Rights and Ditch Easements ...................................... 27 
D. The Emergence of Riparian Rights ...................................................................................... 29 
E. The Emergence of Appropriative Rights .............................................................................. 31 
IV. ON CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 34 
A. The Objects of Conceptual Analysis ..................................................................................... 34 
B. Artifacts and Artifact Concepts ............................................................................................ 35 
C. Likely Features of a Concept for Property ........................................................................... 37 
D. Institutional Status in Property ............................................................................................ 39 







2 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1 
V. A USE-FACILITATING CONCEPT OF PROPERTY ......................................................................... 44 
A. The Function of Property: Facilitating Use ......................................................................... 45 
B. The Subject Matter of Property: Separable Resources ......................................................... 48 
C. The Conventionality of Property: Institutional Status .......................................................... 49 
D. The Priority Established by Property: An In Rem and  Immunized Claim-Right ................ 51 
1. The Claim-Right .............................................................................................................. 52 
2. Immunities ....................................................................................................................... 52 
3. In Rem Rights and Obligations ........................................................................................ 53 
E. Existence and Nondefectiveness Conditions in a Property Concept ..................................... 54 
F. A Concept as a Focal Meaning (Herein of Family Resemblances, Necessary  
Features, and Sufficient Features)............................................................................................ 57 
VI. FOUR TEST CASES RECONSIDERED ......................................................................................... 58 
A. Legal Interests in Tenancies in Common ............................................................................. 58 
B. Easements (and Revocable Licenses) ................................................................................... 62 
C. Running Covenants (and “Mere” Promises About Land Use) ............................................. 65 
D. Mortgages ............................................................................................................................ 69 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................. 70 
 
  3 
PROPERTY, CONCEPTS, AND FUNCTIONS 
ERIC R. CLAEYS* 
Abstract: This article makes two suggestions for ongoing debates about prop-
erty concepts. First, these debates have focused too much on concepts for own-
ership; they have neglected concepts that cover property rights weaker than 
rights of ownership but still robust enough to constitute rights in relation to 
ownable resources. Second, these same debates have neglected the roles that ar-
tifact functions might play in property concepts. Property rights are artifacts, 
and functions play crucial roles in artifacts and the concepts that represent them. 
The Article confirms both suggestions via a close study of one particular proper-
ty concept. That concept is prominent in Anglo-American property common 
law. In that concept’s focal sense, a property right refers to: an immunized and 
in rem claim-right; given institutional status in law and social morality; in rela-
tion to a separable resource; to facilitate the beneficial use of that resource and 
other resources commonly proximate to it. This concept gets its structure from a 
function, the imperative that property rights be structured to serve different peo-
ple’s correlative interests in using resources for rational well-being. This con-
cept explains why the field of property rights covers not only rights of sole 
ownership but also nonpossessory rights and rights in concurrent estates. To il-
lustrate, the Article studies: legal interests in tenancies in common; easements; 
revocable licenses; mortgages; covenants running with the land; riparian rights; 
and appropriative rights and appurtenant ditch easements.  
INTRODUCTION 
A. Property Metaphors 
For a century, scholars have assumed that property is a bundle of 
sticks.1 This bundle view competes with another view whereby property 
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seems like a castle.2 And both of those views compete with a third view 
whereby property seems like a tree.3 
In this Article, I will not argue that any of these views is entirely 
wrong. Nor will I offer any comprehensive alternative to them. But I do 
want to suggest that property and property concepts can be understood bet-
ter than they are now. In this Article, I propose that scholars consider two 
other metaphors for property concepts. In some respects, property concepts 
operate like concepts for representation and discovery. In other respects, 
property concepts operate more like concepts for chairs, clocks, or money. 
B. Two Concepts for Property 
This Article has two suggestions for research on property going for-
ward; each of the analogies just offered illustrates one of them. Consider 
first the analogies to representation and discovery. Some words refer to sev-
eral related but still-distinct concepts. Members of Congress “represent” 
constituents, and paintings “represent” the people and things that painters 
paint. Yet the word “represent” can also refer to a broader and shallower 
class of acts covering all of the above acts, namely acts “making present 
again” figuratively entities not present literally.4 “Discovery” can refer to 
the production of information during litigation, or to the identification of 
previously-unknown knowledge in science.5 Yet the word “discovery” can 
also refer to a broader and shallower concept. This concept encompasses all 
acts “removing cover” from information—i.e., removing obstacles that pre-
venting people from grasping and understanding that information.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 55, at 43–44 
(1888); Arthur Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 (1922); 
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 1–10 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (defining property in-
terests in terms of more fundamental claim-rights, powers, privileges and other analytical inci-
dents associated with the bundle of rights metaphor). 
 2 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Kelo, the Castle, and Natural Property Rights, in PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 35 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972–73 (2006); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and the 
Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 
(2006). An influential pro-property grassroots group is called the “Castle Coalition.” See FAQ, 
CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/faq [https://perma.cc/6C3M-GDJF] (explaining the 
purpose of Castle Coalition). 
 3 See Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 870–
72 (2013). 
 4 See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 8–10 (1967). 
 5 See Discovery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 6 See Discover, FREE DICTIONARY, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/discover [https://perma.
cc/75Z5-992Q]; Discovery, FREE DICTIONARY, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/discovery [https://
perma.cc/L4GA-88C9].  
2019] Property, Concepts, & Functions 5 
In this Article, I suggest that the word “property” creates similar concep-
tual overlaps. In some usages, “property” refers to the sweeping rights of 
managerial authority and disposition we associate with property in resources 
like land, chattels, or money. (In this Article, I describe those sweeping rights 
as rights of “ownership.”) In other usages, however, “property” covers not 
only those rights of ownership but also a broader and shallower class of re-
source-related rights. In this Article, I illustrate with several prominent 
nonpossessory property rights—prominent water rights, servitudes, and mort-
gages—and also with the concurrent estates that tenants in common hold in 
land. I hope to show here that this second and more encompassing concept 
for property has been neglected.7 
C. Property, Artifacts, and Artifact Functions 
Now turn to the analogy between concepts for property and concepts 
for chairs, clocks, and money. These latter objects are all artifacts. Although 
it is difficult to define “artifact,” we can define the term well enough for the 
time being as a class covering objects made by people and used by people, 
to perform one or more activities constitutive of the class.8 Quite often, in-
stances of one class of artifacts can differ quite widely in shape and opera-
tion, and yet the concepts for that class remain coherent.9 Analog, digital, or 
speaking clocks all differ in shapes and operation. Even so, these clocks 
remain instances of a single clock concept because they all constitute time-
telling machines. Although bills and coins differ in their appearances and 
materials, they remain instances of a common concept for fiat currency. 
That is because bills and coins both constitute physical objects, marked with 
seals signifying fiat status, to facilitate commercial exchange. 
In this Article, I suggest that property concepts can operate similarly. 
Since property rights are clearly artifacts, property concepts may derive 
their structure from characteristics we associate with artifacts. In particular, 
artifacts derive much of their structure from “functions”—combinations of 
                                                                                                                           
 7 I was convinced of this possibility by ADAM J. MACLEOD, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL 
REASON 36–44 (2015), and Hugh Breakey, Two Concepts of Property: Ownership of Things and 
Property in Activities, 42 PHIL. F. 239 (2011), although I differ with Breakey and MacLeod in 
how I understand the broad and shallow concepts on which this Article focuses. 
 8 See, e.g., Risto Hilpinen, Artifact, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Ed-
ward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2010 ed.), https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2010/
entries/artifact/ [https://perma.cc/4KUR-W7D7]. 
 9 See Paul Bloom, Intention, History, and Artifact Concepts, 60 COGNITION 1, 14 (1996) 
(providing examples of objects that differ considerably in appearance or content but remain cov-
ered by the same concepts). 
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activities, ends, and means that seem characteristic of particular artifacts.10 
In this Article, I hope to suggest that at least some prominent property con-
cepts derive their structure from functions. This possibility has also been 
neglected in recent scholarship.11 
D. Intended Contributions 
To substantiate these two suggestions, this Article conducts an extend-
ed study of one concept of a property right. In this concept, a property right 
refers in its focal sense to an in rem immunity and claim-right, made con-
ventional in social morality and law, to facilitate the use of the external re-
source covered by the right and other resources commonly proximate to that 
resource. This concept has intellectual roots in natural law-based justifica-
tions for property. It makes central to property a function, namely a tendency 
to facilitate people’s using things in ways that contribute to their rational grat-
ification. And perhaps because this concept makes a notion of use so central 
to property rights, it accounts easily for weak property rights, like the co-
tenancy rights and nonpossessory rights studied in this Article.12 
E. Implications 
If my suggestions here are on target, ongoing debates about property 
concepts may be overdrawn. In an old fable, six blind sages get into a silly 
                                                                                                                           
 10 This Article defines functions infra note 91 and accompanying text. For helpful introduc-
tions to philosophical scholarship on artifacts, see CREATIONS OF THE MIND: THEORIES OF ARTI-
FACTS AND THEIR REPRESENTATION (Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence eds., 2007); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995). The fruits of that analytical scholarship 
have started to percolate into studies of law and legal concepts. See, e.g., LAW AS AN ARTIFACT 
(Luka Burazin et al., 2018). 
 11 In THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988), Jeremy Waldron suggested that property 
rules have one or more functions: “to assign particular objects exclusively to particular individu-
als,” id. at 35, and “to determine . . . who is entitled to [use] which [resource] and when,” id. at 33. 
And in An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
12 (2012), Yun-Chien Chang and Henry E. Smith portrayed civilian and common law property 
rights as different instances of a common artifact. In THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, 
INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES 6–10 (2013), Amnon Lehavi makes his point of departure the insight 
that a property right is a socially constructed object. Yet these suggestions need to be developed 
more than they were by Waldron, Chang, Smith, and Lehavi. 
 12 I hope that this conceptual account is valuable not only in property theory but also in prac-
tice. In 2015, the American Law Institute sponsored a new Restatement (Fourth) of Property, set 
to be more comprehensive than any of its three predecessors. Among its many other goals, the 
Restatement (Fourth) of Property intends to propose analytical definitions of key property con-
cepts—including the “classification of entitlements” arising in property. Restatement of the Law 
Fourth, Property, ALI, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/property/ [https://perma.cc/AMP9-389H]. 
I hope that this Article helps the members of that Restatement project (of whom I am one, as an 
advisor) accomplish that intention. 
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disagreement about what an elephant is after each feels a different part of 
the elephant.13 Now, property rights are surely much more complex than 
elephants are. Even so, property scholars stand to learn a lot from that fable. 
Let me explain briefly, with contrasts to each of the three metaphors with 
which we started. 
The bundle metaphor illustrates skeptical views, views holding that 
“[w]hatever normative force we associate with the concepts” property and 
ownership is “illusory,” “largely the result of historical accident,” and 
“properly attributed to [property rights’] component parts.”14 I call such 
skeptical views “bundle” views because they are often associated with the 
image of a property right as a bundle of sticks.15 
In recent years, scholars who subscribe to bundle views have striven to 
show that property rights come in more forms than ownership rights. Their 
arguments are right as far as they go. Even so, recent arguments for bundle 
views seem to be missing two possibilities. First, those arguments seem to 
assume that, if there exists a coherent concept for property, that concept is 
coextensive with the concept for ownership. But maybe the field of property 
is coherent because it deploys several distinct but complementary concepts. 
And maybe much of property law is rendered coherent by property in the 
wide and simple sense that I discuss here. Second, both of these concepts—
for ownership and property writ large—may be much more coherent than 
bundle theories suggest. Both concepts may get the structures they have 
from artifact functions.16 
The castle metaphor illustrates views I call “exclusion” views. Alt-
hough exclusion views differ in their particulars, they focus primarily on the 
property concept that this Article associates with ownership.17 Ownership 
does play an important role in property law, and exclusion theorists deserve 
credit for explaining its structure. Because exclusion views focus on owner-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Man and the Elephant, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF 
JOHN GODFREY SAXE 111, 111–12 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., Household ed., 1882). 
 14 Shane Nicholas Glackin, Back to Bundles: Deflating Property Rights, Again, 20 LEGAL 
THEORY 1, 2 (2014). 
 15 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 109–10 (8th ed. 2014); EDWARD H. RABIN 
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 1 (6th ed. 2011); see also infra notes 29–31 
and accompanying text. 
 16 I have discussed the implications of artifact methods for bundle theories at greater length in 
Eric R. Claeys, Use and the Function of Property, 63 AM. J. JURIS. 221 (2018). That article also 
discusses the relations between the natures of property rights and the analytical methods by which 
property concepts need to be studied. This Article applies the lessons from that article to contem-
porary debates in legal property theory. 
 17 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY 
E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2017); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROP-
ERTY IN LAW (1997); see also infra notes 32–45 and accompanying text. 
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ship, however, they abstract away from many other property rights promi-
nent in the practice of property. By showing how ownership interacts with a 
wider and more encompassing concept for property rights, this Article sup-
plies a complement and corrective to exclusion views. 
The tree supplies an apt metaphor representing one last family of views 
about property, namely “Progressive” views.18 Although Progressive views 
also differ in their particulars, they tend to portray property as a pluralistic 
institution.19 Such views tend to express great concern about conflating prop-
erty with ownership and exclusive possession; they stress how “[p]roperty 
enables and shapes community life.”20 The tree metaphor reflects these con-
cerns; it makes different property rights seem related but still-different 
branches of a common practice. 
This Article offers two lessons in the alternative about Progressive prop-
erty scholarship. One channel of Progressive scholarship criticizes property 
in sweeping terms: as a “core image . . . in the minds of most people, [in 
which] the owner has a right to exclude others and owes no further obliga-
tion to them.”21 This channel suffers from one of the main problems typical 
of bundle views. Laypeople and lawyers seem not to have a single “core 
image” of property in their minds; they seem comfortable navigating be-
tween two complementary concepts of property. 
Other channels of Progressive scholarship aspire to study property more 
holistically, as an institution advancing “the underlying human values that 
property serves and the social relationships it shapes and reflects.”22 That 
aspiration is taken very seriously in this Article. The use-facilitating concept 
studied here may have the features that Progressive property scholars find 
valuable. This concept structures property around a social function. That 
social function—facilitating the beneficial use of resources—links property 
to values that can give people rights in resources, but it also reconciles those 
rights to the social relationships that Progressive works seek to justify and 
encourage. And even if the concept introduced seems unsatisfying to Pro-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 46–61 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 38, 41 (2011); JOSEPH 
WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 56–94 (2000); LAURA S. UN-
DERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003); Gregory S. Alexander, 
The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753–55 
(2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1963–66 (2005); 
Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437 (2014). 
 20 Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
743, 744 (2009). 
 21 Alexander, supra note 19, at 747. The works by Dagan, Singer, Shoked, and Peñalver cited 
supra note 19 illustrate the concern reflected in the quotation in text. 
 22 Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 743. 
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gressive scholars in some respects, I hope that this Article’s general lessons 
are generative for Progressive scholarship. Perhaps the methods introduced 
in this Article may be repurposed, with different particular concepts that 
Progressives find more satisfying. 
F. The Argument 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I recapitulates the 
conceptual debates surveyed in this Introduction, and it illustrates those de-
bates with nonpossessory property rights and legal interests in tenancies in 
common.23 Part II introduces this Article’s two suggestions: that Anglo-
American common law operates with two complementary general concepts 
for property rights, and that these concepts possess artifact functions.24 
Parts III through VI then turn to the case study by which I hope to con-
firm those two suggestions. Part III introduces the concept by way of several 
doctrines from common law water law—riparian rights, appropriative rights, 
and ditch easements.25 These doctrines recognize nonpossessory property 
rights, and those rights are in no way derivative of ownership rights. Moreo-
ver, the differences between different water rights doctrines illustrate how 
function-oriented practical reasoning operates in property law. Part IV ex-
plains the conceptual methods I assume and apply in this Article.26 Relying 
on those methods, Part V provides a systematic account of one particular con-
cept, the use-facilitating concept introduced and studied here.27 Part VI shows 
how that use-facilitating concept applies to the nonpossessory property rights 
and the cotenancy interests recounted in Part I.28 The last Part concludes, and 
it offers some implications and suggestions for further research. 
I. THREE PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY 
A. Bundle Views: Property as a Bundle of Rights 
To begin, let me recount the three perspectives on property prominent 
in contemporary scholarship. The bundle of sticks metaphor illustrates the 
first family of views, namely bundle views. In bundle views, the interesting 
and important features of property are the sticks. The bundle remains a bun-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra notes 29–76 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 77–100 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 101–147 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 148–192 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 193–237 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 238–277 and accompanying text. 
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dle no matter what sticks are in it. Bundle views probably remain dominant 
both in legal scholarship and in analytical-philosophy scholarship.29 
When bundle views offer accounts of property concepts, those ac-
counts are parsimonious. In one such account, Stephen Munzer argues that 
property involves “a constellation of . . . elements, correlatives, and oppo-
sites; a specification of standard incidents of ownership and other related 
but less powerful interests; and a catalog of ‘things’ . . . that are the subjects 
of these incidents.”30 If that is the most that can be said about property not 
very much has been said. Not all bundle views offer positive accounts of 
property concepts; some deny that any such accounts can be developed. For 
example, Edward Rubin once described property as “simply a label for 
whatever ‘bundle of sticks’ the individual has been granted.”31 
B. Exclusion Views: Property as a Castle 
The castle metaphor illustrates the second family of views, exclusion 
views. In some usages, the term “property” refers to what A.M. Honoré de-
scribed as “the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature legal sys-
tem recognizes.”32 In those usages, property entitles a proprietor to as much 
authority over an ownable thing as a lord enjoys over a castle. Sir William 
Blackstone described the same impression when he described property as 
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises . . . in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”33 
The castle metaphor illustrates exclusion views only crudely, however, 
because the metaphor is overbroad. Blackstone’s “sole and despotic domin-
ion” portrait begins his discussion of property, and he spends much of the 
next two volumes of his Commentaries qualifying that portrait.34 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26–28 
(1977); Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 57 (2014); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 30 STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 23 (1990); see Stephen R. Munzer, Prop-
erty and Disagreement, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 289, 289 (James E. 
Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013). 
 31 Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1086 
(1984); see supra note 14 and accompanying text (quoting Shane Glackin to similar effect). 
 32 A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 108 (A.G. Guest 
ed., 1961) (emphasis removed). 
 33 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 34 See, e.g., id. at *14 (acknowledging a limited “usufructuary” property in the use of light, 
water, and air); id. at *20–43 (discussing implied ways and other incorporeal hereditaments); id. at 
*212–14 (enumerating various justifications supplying defenses for trespass to land). For a survey 
of the (many) works deflating the “sole and despotic dominion” passage, see David B. Schorr, 
How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 104 n.2 (2009). 
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Honoré described the package of ownership rights he delineated as a 
“standard case,” valuable mainly as a heuristic situating “variants and pos-
sible alternatives.”35 Most exclusion theorists portray ownership and exclu-
sive authority similarly.36 
We can illustrate with works from the two exclusion theorists most in-
fluential in recent American scholarship, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith. 
As relevant here, Merrill makes two claims about property. One claim is ana-
lytical: The right to exclude is analytically necessary to a property right.37 By 
a “right to exclude,” Merrill does not mean a right conferring managerial au-
thority as sweeping as Blackstone’s sole and despotic dominion. Rather, he 
seems to suggest that property entitles a proprietor to be at least as free from 
interference as the freedom to which an easement or a riparian right entitles 
its holder.38 
Merrill’s second claim is normative: Exclusive property constitutes a 
valuable strategy to apply to ownable resources.39 This strategy is valuable 
only presumptively. In this portrait, castle-like property rights supply a first 
approximation for property rights in real life. The property strategy supplies 
the “base” of a metaphorical pyramid, and “refined” alternatives are proper-
ly understood as “upper reaches” resting on that base.40 
Smith defends exclusion on normative grounds similar to Merrill’s. 
Smith portrays property rights as falling along “a spectrum between the poles 
of exclusion and governance.”41 “In exclusion, decisions about resource use 
are delegated to an owner who, as gatekeeper, is responsible for deciding on 
and monitoring specific activities;” governance rules “pick out uses and users 
in more detail [and] impos[e] a more intense informational burden on a 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Honoré, supra note 32, at 107–08. 
 36 For other variations on exclusion theories, see, for example, HARRIS, supra note 17; PEN-
NER, supra note 17; Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Defining Property Rights, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 30, at 219; Arthur Ripstein, Possession and 
Use, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 30, at 156; Robert C. El-
lickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993); Christopher Essert, The Office of Owner-
ship, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 418 (2013); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 
58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2009); Meredith Render, The Concept of Property, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 
437 (2017); James Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167 
(2017). 
 37 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. 
RTS. CONF. J. 1, 2–3 (2014) [hereinafter Merrill, The Right to Exclude II]; Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730, 740–45 (1998) [hereinafter Merrill, 
The Right to Exclude I]. 
 38 See Merrill, The Right to Exclude I, supra note 37, at 746–49. 
 39 Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2067 (2012). 
 40 Id. at 2063. 
 41 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. OF LEGAL STUD. S453, S454 (2002). 
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smaller audience of duty holders.”42 For Smith, exclusion supplies a “core of 
[property] architecture,” a “rough first cut—and only that—at serving the 
purposes of property.”43 Exclusion works well, for example, when many in-
dividuals who do not know one another have intermittent interactions with a 
resource. Smith finds that strategy applicable in the law of nuisance, a field in 
which simple boundary rules facilitate coordination among strangers.44 As 
uses become more valuable and different users come to know more about one 
another, however, governance regimes come to be preferable.45 
C. Progressive Property Views: Property as a Tree 
The third family of views covers Progressive views on property. 
Throughout Progressive works one can see a few themes especially relevant 
here.46 Progressive works tend to assume a portrait of property they engage 
as a foil—the unqualified “castle” view recounted in the last section. In his 
book Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property, Joseph Singer describes and 
critiques an “ownership model,” a model that makes freedom to enjoy prop-
erty seem primary and limits on that freedom difficult to justify.47 To situate 
his portrait of property, Hanoch Dagan opposes it against several major 
views which (he says) regard “exclusion as the core of property.”48 To in-
troduce a capabilities-based justification for property, Gregory Alexander 
opposed it against a lay view whereby “[t]he core image of property . . . is 
that the owner has a right to exclude others and owes no further obligation 
to them.”49 
Progressive works find this castle view wanting, and they conclude 
that all exclusion views are similarly wanting. Analytically, exclusion sup-
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. at S454–45; accord Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1691, 1702–04 (2012). 
 43 Smith, supra note 42, at 1705. Indeed, Smith introduced his exclusion-governance continu-
um in part to discourage other scholars from “concentrat[ing] on rights of exclusion” to the ne-
glect of common or open access strategies. Smith, supra note 41, at S454. 
 44 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004); Henry 
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004) [here-
inafter Smith, Exclusion in Nuisance]. 
 45 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 42. 
 46 For helpful overviews of Progressive property, see John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in 
Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743–46 (2011); Ezra Rosser, 
The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 
115–26 (2013). 
 47 SINGER, supra note 19, at 62. 
 48 DAGAN, supra note 19, at 38. 
 49 Alexander, supra note 19, at 747. 
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plies a “misleading . . . conceptual baseline” for property.50 Normatively, 
exclusion also seems “inadequate” as “the sole basis . . . for designing prop-
erty institutions.”51 Among other reasons, exclusive ownership is troubling 
because it seems likely to restrict or deny non-owners’ access to valuable 
resources.52 
When they offer their own accounts of property, Progressive scholars 
tend to portray the field as complex. A prominent statement of Progressive 
property principles holds that property “implicates plural and incommen-
surable values.”53 Dagan insists that “the meaning of property is not homo-
geneous but varies instead with its social settings and with the categories of 
resources subject to property rights,”54 and he conceives of property as “an 
umbrella for a set of institutions.”55 Singer describes property as a field of-
fering a menu of many different standard-issue rights.56 For Singer, the con-
cept property incorporates one necessary element, a Hohfeldian claim-right 
guaranteeing the right-holder respect for justified expectations.57 Beyond 
that, however, the field of property offers a wide range of “paradigms that 
decision makers can follow.”58 In one recent work, Alexander argued that 
property consists not of a single one-size-fits-all form but a category with 
two dominant forms. One of those forms covers the exclusionary rights cen-
tral to exclusion theories. The other is “governance property,” and that latter 
form encompasses many “fragment[ed]” or “more limited” rights including 
“use rights . . . to assets owned by others.”59 
Finally, Progressive works tend to stress the role that property can play 
in facilitating interpersonal association. For example, in his article Property 
as Entrance, Eduardo Peñalver warns that property scholarship has “put too 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in PROP-
ERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 9 (Charles Geisler & 
Gail Daneker eds., 2000); accord DAGAN, supra note 19, at 40–41 (portraying property as “a 
monistic institution” makes it “bear [no] resemblance to the law of property as lawyers know it or 
. . . as citizens experience it”). 
 51 Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 743. 
 52 See SINGER, supra note 19, at 160–71; Alexander, supra note 19, at 747, 753–54; Alexan-
der et al., supra note 20, at 744. 
 53 Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 743. 
 54 DAGAN, supra note 19, at 43. 
 55 Id. at 42. 
 56 See SINGER, supra note 19, at 1–5. 
 57 See id. at 209–12. On Hohfeld’s analytic vocabulary, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–58 
(1913). Hohfeld called claim-rights, duties, powers, liabilities, and the other four relations in his 
taxonomy “fundamental jural relations.” Id. at 28. I will follow suit in this Article. 
 58 SINGER, supra note 19, at 86–87. 
 59 Gregory Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855–56 (2012). 
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much stock in property’s isolating power and failed to acknowledge the many 
ways in which property actually increases owners’ social obligations.”60 
No single metaphor can capture fully all of these various conceptual por-
traits. I suggested the image of a tree in the Introduction because it seems 
more representative than any other metaphor I can think of. The metaphor 
comes (via Anna di Robilant) from twentieth-century French and Italian ju-
rists. Those jurists believed that property encouraged both regularity and vari-
ety. Property’s metaphorical trunk represents property’s regular and possesso-
ry core; the branches represent the “many resource-specific bundles of enti-
tlements” that are instantiated in different property rights.61 
D. Four Test Cases 
Scholars who subscribe to exclusion views claim that property con-
cepts impart regular structure to property rights in practice. That claim is 
contested by scholars who subscribe to bundle or Progressive views. To 
bolster their criticisms, scholars who subscribe to bundle or Progressive 
views frequently cite relatively weak property rights. In this Article, I focus 
on possessory rights held by several co-owners concurrently and on several 
different nonpossessory rights.62 
The first illustrative right is the easement. An easement entitles its 
holder to enter a servient estate and to traverse or use that estate for one or 
more purposes.63 An easement constitutes a nonpossessory legal interest in 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Peñalver, supra note 19, at 1893; accord DAGAN, supra note 19, at 41; SINGER, supra note 
19, at 94. 
 61 di Robilant, supra note 3, at 872. 
 62 Progressive scholars also cite examples that seem to confound broad and exclusionary por-
traits of property. For example, in the 1971 case State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 375–76 (N.J. 1971), 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey limited the right of exclusive possession so as not to entitle a land 
owner to exclude a welfare caseworker or a Legal Services corporate lawyer from entering to meet a 
migrant worker whom they wanted to help. See Alexander, supra note 19, at 808–09 (praising 
Shack). Or, common carrier regulations restrict the freedom of business covered by them to refuse to 
serve prospective customers or to charge the prices they would like for their services. See DAGAN, 
supra note 19, at 48–49. These examples can be dealt with by showing that the institution of owner-
ship has one or several functions like the one I will attribute to property rights in this Article. This 
point has been suggested in MACLEOD, supra note 7, at 42–44; Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Pri-
vate Law Theory: A Comment on Property As the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 (2012) 
https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol125_claeys.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5TY-
GMKM]; Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J. WATCH 255 (2011). 
I hope to make the point more systematically in subsequent work. 
 63 See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.1, at 435–
37 (West 3d ed. 2000). 
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property, but it is a property right.64 On that basis, easements have been cit-
ed to refute exclusion views.65 
The next right is a close cousin to the easement—the covenant running 
with the land (hereinafter, a “running covenant”). Running covenants are 
promises between two landowners about the future uses of their lots. Most 
commonly, covenant promises commit landowners to forswear certain uses 
of their lots (say, non-residential uses) and/or to dedicate those lots to spe-
cific uses (say, stand-alone residential housing, with designated setbacks or 
types of construction).66 An ordinary contractual promise obligates promi-
sors in their personal capacities. When a land-related promise satisfies the 
requirements for a running covenant, however, it binds whoever happens to 
own or occupy the relevant estate—whether or not she made the promise 
herself.67 Running covenants are also nonpossessory interests—and proper-
ty rights.68 And since such covenants are property rights, they are also cited 
to confound exclusion views. As Amnon Lehavi argues, because “the core 
essence” of a running covenant lies in the right “to secure or prevent a cer-
tain use,” such a covenant undermines the primacy of “the right to ex-
clude.”69 
Next comes the mortgage. A mortgage constitutes a security interest on 
an asset pledged to secure a debt. Typically, a mortgage entitles the debtor 
to retain title to the pledged asset. If the debtor-mortgagor fails to repay the 
debt, however, the mortgage entitles the creditor-mortgagee to foreclose on 
the asset and to sell it to satisfy the debt.70 Like easements and running cov-
enants, mortgages constitute nonpossessory rights—and property rights.71 
For that reason, they have been cited to refute exclusion views. As Lehavi 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND 
§ 1.1 (2018); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 57, § 8.1, at 438. 
 65 See Glackin, supra note 14, at 4; Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property 
Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1020 (2009); see also Christo-
pher J. Essert, Property in Licenses and the Law of Things, 59 MCGILL L.J. 559, 561–62 (2014) 
(arguing that easements contradict Blackstone’s exclusion portrait of property); Daniel B. Kelly, 
The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 896–98 (2013) (defining an easement as a “nonposses-
sory right to enter and use land in the possession of another” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000))). 
 66 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 6.1, at 226–27 (2014). 
 67 See id. § 6.1–.3, at 232–66. 
 68 See id. § 6.1, at 228–31. 
 69 See LEHAVI, supra note 11, at 49; see also Singer, supra note 50, at 1024–26. 
 70 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 17, at 818–19. The mortgage model described in text is 
the “lien” model. Another model, the “title” model, vests ownership in the creditor-mortgagee 
until the debt is repaid. The power described in text is not unlimited; the creditor-mortgagee owes 
the debtor-mortgagor a duty to deliver any profits remaining after he has repaid the debt. See 
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 17, at 818–19. 
 71 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
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argues, a mortgage does not entitle a creditor-mortgagee to exclude anyone 
from the mortgaged asset or to manage its uses in any specific ways; it only 
supplies the creditor-mortgagee with an enforceable right to make the asset 
“serv[e] as security for a debt.”72 
Similar arguments can be made with property rights that vest present 
possession of an ownable resource in several concurrent owners. For exam-
ple, in a tenancy in common, all co-owners hold rights to possess the entire-
ty of the property. In some tenancies, passive cotenants let one active coten-
ant occupy the whole premises for everyone’s common benefit; in others, 
all cotenants occupy different parts of the premises and they work out ar-
rangements for concurrent access and use.73 Even though cotenancy inter-
ests are more limited than solely-held rights of ownership, they are still 
classified as property rights.74 Munzer argues that exclusion views cannot 
explain how or to what extent tenancies in common are property rights.75 
Alexander argues that such cotenancies confirm his claim that there exists a 
category of “governance” property separate from exclusion property.76 
II. TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR PROPERTY CONCEPTS 
I hope that the last Part surveyed the main lines of recent debate as 
charitably as an introductory survey can. If that survey was tolerably fair, 
recent debates seem disjointed in two important respects. 
A. Property and Ownership 
First, disputants seem to be assuming different concepts of property. 
Imagine an argument about concepts related to “representation.” One per-
son claims: “Representation is a valuable institution because agents often 
serve principals’ interests more effectively than principals do on their own.” 
The second protests: “That claim is too simplistic! It can’t explain the many 
ways in which members of legislatures act in relation to constituents! Or the 
many ways in which artists can make portraits of subjects!” Or, imagine 
two people arguing over discovery. One person claims: “Discovery is valu-
able because it is good to find new lands.” And the second protests: “That 
claim is too simplistic! It doesn’t account for the problems in civil litiga-
tion! Or the complications that arise in science!” 
                                                                                                                           
 72 LEHAVI, supra note 11, at 49; see also Singer, supra note 65, at 1026, 1028. 
 73 See SINGER, supra note 66, § 8.2.1, at 351. 
 74 See id. § 8.2, at 351–52. 
 75 See Munzer, supra note 30, at 295–96. 
 76 See Alexander, supra note 59, at 1861–62. 
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Or course, both of these imaginary debates are silly. In both, disputants 
are associating the same words with different concepts. Nevertheless, both 
debates illustrate a scenario in which conceptual confusion seems likely. In 
that scenario, one word in English refers to two or more concepts. The rele-
vant concepts are related but distinct. The extension of the first concept is 
shallow and broad. (Representation as making present, or discovery as the 
un-covering of otherwise-inaccessible information.) The extension of the 
second concept is narrow and deep. (Representation as the advocacy of a 
principal’s interests by an agent, or discovery as the identification of new 
lands.) And the narrow concept refers to a specific phenomenon that is cov-
ered as one of many possible instances of the broad concept. I suspect that 
several concepts prominent in property relate to one another as the pairs of 
representation and discovery concepts just described.  
Before I explain my suspicion, however, I must introduce one distinc-
tion that plays an important role in the rest of my argument—the distinction 
between general and particular concepts. General concepts apply universal-
ly, while particular concepts are contingent and local to particular commu-
nities or eras.77 In what follows, I posit that there exist general concepts rep-
resenting property rights of different strengths and scopes. I assume that 
these general concepts could be represented by one or more particular con-
cepts for property rights.78 In later Parts of this Article, I study one particu-
lar concept that represents one of the general concepts I introduce here. The 
general concept might be represented by other particular concepts; I do not 
mean to rule that possibility out. The general concept might also be repre-
sented differently in some details by different particular concepts, and I do 
not mean to rule that possibility out, either. For my purposes, it suffices to 
show that property law and practice assume some recurring distinctions be-
tween different property rights, and that at least one particular concept ex-
plains those distinctions. 
With that background, we can grasp two distinct general concepts for 
property rights. One such concept represents the sense in which “property” 
evokes the image of a castle. In this sense, property refers to legal relations 
we associate with trespass and a right of exclusive possession, and legal 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED: BEING THE FIRST 
PART OF A SERIES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 2 
(2d ed. 1861). 
 78 Some scholarly works describe the same basic distinction by differentiating between con-
cepts and “conceptions” that might approximate that concept. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 70–72 (1986) (using the terms “concept” and “conception” to “contrast between 
levels of abstraction at which [an] interpretation of the practice can be studied”). 
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relations we associate with a right of exclusive disposition. A fee simple 
absolute certainly embodies this image and that concept of property. 
Thanks to another general concept, however, in another sense “proper-
ty” seems to refer to a wide range of rights relating to external resources. 
This concept covers the many weak legal interests that might be granted 
from a fee—like an easement, a running covenant, a mortgage, or an inter-
est in a tenancy in common—and still seem strong and irrevocable enough 
to count as “rights.” Now, this concept is assumed more often than it is 
elaborated or defined thoroughly. Even so, many other concepts operate the 
same way—and a surprising number of legal distinctions hinge on lawyers’ 
applying this concept routinely and accurately. Courts and commentators 
describe easements as “interests” or “rights” in property—as opposed to, 
say, revocable licenses, which are called mere “privilege[s].”79 When a par-
ticular incident is classified as “property,” a “property interest,” or a “prop-
erty right,” courts are quick to presume that ongoing violations of the inci-
dent deserve protection in equity.80 Property in this sense is protected by 
eminent-domain limitations;81 weaker incidents like licenses are not.82 In 
statutory law, legislatures take for granted that there exists some category of 
legal interests called “property,” and they make such interests attachable in 
court proceedings83 or assets to be administered during a bankruptcy.84  
To avoid confusion, I am not going to use the term “property” to refer 
to castle-like rights except when context demands otherwise. When I refer 
to property rights conferring sweeping exclusive authority, I follow Honoré 
and describe the relevant concept as a general concept of “ownership.”85 I 
reserve the term “property” to refer to the more capacious field I have been 
describing here. The general concept for property in this capacious sense 
                                                                                                                           
 79 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 63, § 8.1, at 435, 438; accord Wehby v. Turpin, 710 
So. 2d 1243, 1251 (Ala. 1998) (distinguishing licenses from easements on the ground that the 
former are mere “personal privilege[s]”). 
 80 See, e.g., Baseball Publ’g Co. v. Bruton, 18 N.E.2d 362, 364–65 (Mass. 1938) (ordering 
equitable relief to protect a valid easement against ongoing interference); DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.9(3), at 168 (2d ed. 1993) (“Injunc-
tions are commonly sought and appropriately issued to prevent many kinds of threatened torts to 
property interests, as well as to restore property already tortiously harmed.”). 
 81 See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 42–44 (1960) (holding that a material-
man’s lien constitutes a property right protected by eminent-domain limitations). 
 82 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 64, § 1.4 (comparing easements and licenses). 
 83 See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288–89 (2002) (holding that a cotenant’s 
interest in a tenancy by the entirety constitutes property under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a tax-judgment 
attachment statute). 
 84 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2018) (defining as “property” of a bankruptcy estate “all legal 
or equitable interests of a debtor in property”). 
 85 I will make exceptions only when I treat scholarly works and legal sources that refer to 
what I call “ownership” here as “property.” 
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encompasses all jural relations in ownable resources that seem robust 
enough to be called property rights. So understood, property includes not 
only fees simple and rights of absolute ownership but also easements. Such 
relations exclude jural relations that seem too weak to constitute property 
rights (revocable licenses again) and relations that seem to lack the requisite 
relation to ownable resources (contractual promises). As used here, the set 
of ownership rights is a subset of the set for property rights writ large. Thus, 
a fee simple absolute constitutes both property and rights of ownership. If a 
fee owner grants an easement to someone else, however, that second party 
would hold property but not ownership rights in the easement. 
B. Property and Functions 
Assume I am right that the field of property operates with two comple-
mentary but still-distinct general concepts. If I am right, another question 
arises: Can property scholars supply satisfying accounts of the concept for 
property writ large? It seems easy to supply a one-size-fits-all account of 
ownership; that is why the castle image is so pervasive in property scholar-
ship.86 By contrast, it seems far more daunting to explain why and how ease-
ments, mortgages, running covenants, and cotenancy interests all belong 
within the same general concept. 
That question takes us to the second suggestion of this Article. I think 
property scholars can develop satisfying accounts of property in the capa-
cious sense on which this Article focuses. To do so, however, such scholars 
may need to look at property rights differently—through the lenses of philo-
sophical scholarship on artifacts. And here is where analogies to chairs, 
clocks, and fiat currency become relevant. Consider chairs. At first blush, it 
may seem impossible to produce a satisfying one-size-fits-all list of fea-
tures87 that comprise the concept by which we represent chairs. Chairs can 
have no, one, or several legs, they can be made of different materials, and 
their seats and backs can be constructed in different ways. But this strategy 
seems unpromising; it is pitched at too specific a level of explanation.88 One 
can develop a more satisfying account of a chair concept by saying that the 
                                                                                                                           
 86 I doubt that the concept for ownership is as determinate as is assumed by the conventional 
wisdom described in text. See supra note 62. 
 87 Such lists have been described as definitions per genus et differentiam, see H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 14–15 (3d ed. 2012), and as lists of “universal quantified conditions,” see 
Mark C. Murphy, Defect and Deviance in Natural Law Jurisprudence, in INSTITUTIONALIZED 
REASON: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT ALEXY 45, 46 (Matthias Klatt ed., 2012). 
 88 And also because it tests an account of an artifact concept with methods better suited for 
concepts representing natural kinds or mathematical figures. See Claeys, supra note 16, at 225, 
231–33. 
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concept covers “artifact[s] . . . manufactured for people to sit on, with a cer-
tain typical shape or form.”89 Similarly, it seems unpromising to account for 
clocks as objects with hands, numbers, and/or faces; it seems more promis-
ing to account for them as machines made to tell time. 
I do not claim here that the strategy suggested in the last paragraph 
works for every artifact or artifact concept. Nor do I claim that it can ex-
plain every feature about property. But I do think that the strategy is ex-
tremely promising. Recent property scholarship focuses too much on the 
forms we associate with property concepts. That scholarship abstracts from 
the ways in which those forms might relate to the values that make property 
concepts worth having. Property might be explicable as a certain kind of 
jural relation, structured as seems likely to perform some activity regarded 
as a characteristic of property. 
To see why, consider first the characteristics of artifacts. By definition, 
an artifact is an intention-dependent object.90 Searle and other philosophers 
who study artifacts describe artifacts and the intentions they satisfy in terms 
of functions. A function refers to (a) a typical activity (b) that brings about a 
valuable (c) goal (d) that the artifact is expected to perform because it real-
izes the goal.91 Thus, when we say that time-telling is the function of a clock, 
we mean that: it is characteristic of a clock to tell time; it is normatively 
valuable to know the time; knowing time constitutes a goal that people may 
pursue; and the desire to have the time reported reliably is a cause of the 
creation and use of clocks. We shouldn’t be surprised if and when people 
organize artifacts and artifact concepts around such functions. 
To be sure, functions also complicate studies of property concepts. As 
social philosopher Amie Thomasson puts it, artifacts are “notoriously mal-
leable and historical in nature,”92 and artifacts have such characteristics be-
cause their functions are malleable and historical. We associate clocks with 
time-telling machines but then encounter difficulties with ornamental 
clocks. “Knickers” used to represent men’s breeches; now they represent 
loose-fitting sports shorts in some usages and women’s underwear in other 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Andrei Marmor, Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence), in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 209, 211 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2013). 
 90 See Hilpinen, supra note 8, § 4; Lynne Rudder Baker, The Shrinking Difference Between 
Artifacts and Natural Objects, 7 APA NEWSL. ON PHIL. & COMPUTERS (Am. Phil. Ass’n, Newark, 
Del.), no. 2, Spring 2008, at 2, 3. 
 91 See MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 29 (2006); Amie 
L. Thomasson, Realism and Human Kinds, 67 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 580, 592–604 
(2003). 
 92 Amie L. Thomasson, Artifacts and Human Concepts, in CREATIONS OF THE MIND: THEO-
RIES OF ARTIFACTS AND THEIR REPRESENTATION 52, 62 (Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence eds., 
2007). 
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usages.93 And property concepts seem more susceptible to variation than 
these concepts do.  
The concern this objection raises is a serious one. It does not make 
conceptual analysis impossible, but it does limit significantly the lessons 
that any single conceptual study can offer. To address the concern, I hope to 
make a general suggestion and a specific demonstration. The demonstration 
is as follows: One prominent particular concept in Anglo-American law 
seems organized around a specific function. That demonstration offers some 
important insights about how functions might affect property concepts. That 
demonstration is narrow, however, because the insights offered here may be 
contingent on the function central to the concept. The demonstration provides 
some confirmation for a broader suggestion: Scholarship needs to consider 
the possibility that property concepts relate somehow to artifact functions. 
C. Implications 
Assume that these suggestions are accurate. If they are, what is miss-
ing from current views toward property rights? 
Let me start with bundle views. On one hand, such views have per-
formed one important service: they have made clear that the practice of 
property probably relies on several interlocking but distinct concepts. On 
the other hand, once that insight is accounted for, bundle views seem unsat-
isfying in important respects. Recent defenses of bundle views have relied 
on interests in tenancies in common, easements, and other property rights 
weaker than ownership rights to show that property rights have “no substan-
tive, essential connection to each other.”94 But these and other property 
rights can be reconciled to one another fairly easily. To reconcile the rights, 
one only needs to appreciate that they are instances of property rights and 
not ownership rights. This Article thus shifts the burden of persuasion. 
Since the examples bundle scholars have offered do not support their argu-
ments, they need to clarify those arguments. 
Now for exclusion views. If property concepts have functions, those 
functions may help clarify when and why exclusion gives way to property 
rights that exclusion theorists describe as “refined” or governance-related 
alternatives to exclusion.95 In addition, exclusion views may focus a great 
deal of attention on a narrow band of property rights. Rights of ownership 
are important in practice. But the features that define ownership may not be 
helpful in defining other rights that seem to constitute property rights. For 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Thomasson, supra note 91, at 601. 
 94 Glackin, supra note 14, at 4. 
 95 See supra notes 41 and 43 and accompanying text. 
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example, Smith describes nonpossessory rights and concurrent estates both 
as instances of governance. Yet “governance” does very little work to de-
scribe or identify the characteristics that make these rights property rights.96 
Similarly, Merrill has argued that easements and other nonpossessory rights 
constitute property rights consistent with his (analytical) views on exclu-
sion. “[A]lthough the holder of [such an] interest does not have a general 
right to exclude others from defined metes and bounds,” he argues, “such a 
person is given a full panoply of legal rights to protect the limited interest 
that they have from interference.”97 This argument contains an ambiguity. 
When a view makes a “right to exclude” necessary to property, that right 
can be broad (for Merrill, a “general right to exclude”) or narrow (for Mer-
rill, a limited right conferring a “full panoply of legal rights”). The former 
understanding points toward Merrill’s portrait of exclusion and ownership; 
the latter one points toward a weaker and more encompassing form of prop-
erty. The latter understanding is not adequately accounted for in Merrill’s 
work. 
The same two basic implications also apply to Progressive scholarship. 
This Article confirms the concern, prominent in Progressive scholarship, 
that property cannot be reduced solely to a right to exclude. Since “it takes a 
theory to beat a theory,”98 however, more needs to be said in Progressive 
scholarship about how legal interests in tenancies in common and nonpos-
sessory property rights constitute property. Indeed, scholars who subscribe 
to Progressive views should find the answers to this question helpful for 
their own projects. After all, when sole owners create concurrent estates and 
nonpossessory rights, they share their resources. Those legal interests facili-
tate the social interactions cherished in Progressive scholarship. 
D. A Way Forward 
In the Introduction, I promised I would make two general suggestions 
and then conduct a case study. This Part has explained both of the sugges-
tions. To do so, however, this Part has reasoned with top-down arguments. 
To suggest that the field of property relies on several complementary con-
cepts, I argued by analogy to the word meanings and concepts associated 
with “representation” and “discovery.” To suggest that property concepts 
may be organized around functions, I reasoned from characteristics that 
seem essential to all artifacts. 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See supra notes 32–45 and accompanying text. 
 97 Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude I, supra note 37, at 748. 
 98 Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors 
Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983). 
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Because I have explained my suggestions by simple analogies and top-
down reasoning, the suggestions have only limited force. They have no 
more force than a finding of probable cause would have; they warrant fur-
ther investigation but do not demonstrate anything conclusive about proper-
ty rights. In the rest of this Article, I want to provide confirmation for the 
suggestions. To do so, I intend to switch course and study property from the 
“bottom up.” I want to show that there does exist a general concept for 
property distinct from the concept focusing on ownership. And I also want 
to show that at least one particular concept representing that general con-
cept operates via an artifact function. 
In the rest of this Article, I conduct a case study of a concept that oper-
ates primarily in Anglo-American common law—the field of property cov-
ering the cotenancy interests and nonpossessory rights introduced in Section 
I.D. The concept supplies an account for a property right that is both coher-
ent and distinct from a concept covering ownership. Moreover, this concept 
reconciles different property rights in relation to an artifact function. 
To be sure, since I focus on one single and particular concept of prop-
erty, there are limits to what the following case study can teach. I focus on 
cotenancies and nonpossessory property rights in part because these doc-
trines loom large in recent property-theory scholarship, and in part because 
they illustrate vividly how a property concept can vary in application con-
sistent with a function.99 I hope that the following study makes more sense 
of those rights than current accounts do. More generally, I also hope that the 
following study illustrates in a concrete way how artifact functions might 
affect property concepts. But the concept on which I rely to study those 
doctrines may not apply in other settings—in other common law fields of 
property, or in fields of public law in which statutory or regulatory duties 
are imposed on property.100 And different property concepts and functions 
may differ from the concept and the function studied in this Article. Readers 
will need to decide for themselves how much one can generalize from the 
particulars of the function in the concept I study. 
                                                                                                                           
 99 I also focus on cotenancy interests and nonpossessory rights because they illustrate the 
relations between functions and concepts in a straightforward manner. I suspect that concepts for 
stronger property rights—in other words, rights of ownership—can also be structured around 
functions. But I also suspect that the relationship between ownership rights and property functions 
is extremely indirect. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between 
Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009). 
 100 Similarly, I do not mean to suggest that the particular concept I will study is the only con-
cept that could account for the property rights introduced in section I.D. Different particular con-
cepts might overlap and complement one another as they apply to basic nonpossessory and con-
current property rights. 
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To begin the following conceptual analysis, I study closely common 
law property rights in a single setting—the water rights and implied ease-
ments that arise around rivers and other courses of running surface water 
(hereinafter, “water rights”). I start with water rights and related easements 
because they illustrate extremely vividly several features of property rights. 
Once we grasp those features, we can use them to illustrate the conceptual 
methods I hope to introduce in the rest of this Article. 
III. PROPERTY CONCEPTS AND WATER RIGHTS 
A. Why Water Rights? 
Why focus first on water rights and related easements? There are a few 
reasons. To begin with, water rights and easements appurtenant to them il-
lustrate the concept described in Section II.A. As prominent as fees simple 
and rights of absolute ownership are in scholarship, such rights are not il-
luminating as to the concept for property writ large. In history and practice, 
many communities have recognized as property not only ownership rights 
but also usufructs—limited property rights structured around the ongoing 
use of the external resource covered.101 Usufructs test the scope of that con-
cept for property writ large, and water rights and ditch easements both con-
stitute usufructs. 
Moreover, water rights represent the broadest rights that proprietors 
can hold in relation to the resources they cover. In that respect, water rights 
differ from the property rights introduced in Section I.D: express ease-
                                                                                                                           
 101 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3–10, *14 (contrasting “transient” 
or “usufructuary” property with rights of ownership in English law); Ellickson, supra note 36, at 
1367 (surveying early human practices recognizing usufructs in land). 
 Throughout this Article, I use “usufruct” as a conceptual term of art. As a term of art, a usu-
fruct refers to a property right entitling the proprietor to use and/or consume an otherwise un-
owned resource as long as he uses or consumes that resource regularly, subject to qualifications 
respecting the correlative rights of other usufruct-holders. This usage stands in some tension with 
a different usage whereby a usufruct refers to a property right entitling the proprietor to use and/or 
consume a resource owned by someone else. See, e.g., J. INST. 2.4 (J.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 
1913). That latter usage is influential especially in civilian property law. See, e.g., A.N. Yian-
nopoulos, Usufruct: General Principles Louisiana and Comparative Law, 27 LA. L. REV. 369 
(1967). The usage I follow seems influential in Anglo-American law, as is shown by the passages 
from Blackstone just quoted and by this Part’s discussion of water rights. The usage I follow is 
also familiar to economists who study property rights (like Ellickson) and also to legal philoso-
phers. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 51 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2004) (describing 
all property rights as being subject to “inchoate trust . . . or usufruct in favour of all other per-
sons”). Thomas Jefferson popularized this latter usage when he said “that the earth belongs in 
usufruct to the living.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
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ments,102 running covenants, mortgages, and interests in tenancies in com-
mon. All of those latter property rights are all derivative. None can arise 
until an owner in fee or absolute ownership chooses to create and convey 
them. Exclusion theories can explain those latter rights to a limited extent, 
by portraying them all as specialized modifications of ownership rights. 
That limited explanation does not apply to water rights or ditch easements. 
As this Part shows, the property rights that appropriative rights confer on 
their holders constitute rights separate from and not derivative of property 
rights in any other resources. Although riparian rights are bundled together 
with property in riparian land, the specific policies that structure property in 
land do not affect the structure of riparian rights. As a result, riparian rights 
still convey the greatest interest that right-holders may hold in relation to 
the riparian water. Because appropriative rights and riparian rights both 
convey the greatest interests that private right-holders may hold in riparian 
water flow, they confirm that property law relies on at least one conceptual 
template besides the template for ownership. 
Most important, water rights and ditch easements illustrate in property 
the sorts of variations that one sees across artifacts. Like digital and analog 
clocks or bills and coins, the main categories of water rights institute distinct 
regulatory and property systems. These categories create strikingly-different 
rights in relation to the flow from water courses and land appurtenant to those 
courses. As a result, those categories illustrate vividly how different specific 
property doctrines can be rendered coherent by a single function. 
B. Water Rights and Ditch Easements 
To set up the illustration, let us review some basic principles of the law 
of water rights and ditch easements at common law.103 Riparian rights con-
stitute nonpossessory property rights in secure expectations to the use of 
riparian water. A riparian right entitles its holder to a usufructuary property 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Throughout this Article, when I refer to “easements,” I mean easements created by express 
grant. When I discuss express easements in close proximity to the easements that arise by implica-
tion in connection with appropriative water rights, to avoid confusion I will refer to easements 
created by express grant as “expressly-created” easements. 
 103 Some American states have combined aspects of both riparianism and prior appropriation 
in their water law. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASE-
BOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 130–33 (7th ed. 2014). Even in states that adopted riparian 
rights or appropriative rights at common law, state legislatures have modified common law princi-
ples in many significant respects. See id. at 193–268 (recounting statutory modifications to appro-
priative rights systems). See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WA-
TERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2018) (recounting statutory and regula-
tory administration of riparian rights). I focus in text on the common law systems for ease of ex-
position. 
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right. The right is to reasonable amounts of flow from the water course; the 
right is accompanied by a duty not to destroy or consume the riparian water. 
In cases of conflict, “reasonability” is determined by analyzing all relevant 
circumstances. Such analysis gives highest priority to uses of water espe-
cially valuable for basic domestic uses. It then gives significant weight to 
how compatible one riparian’s use is with other uses of water flow by other 
riparians, or to preferences recognized by local statutes.104 This reasonable 
use regime makes riparian rights usufructuary. To show that some other ri-
parian’s use interferes with his reasonable use, a riparian must first show 
that he is actually using some riparian flow.  
Although a riparian right is technically distinct from the estate in land 
held by a riparian land owner, the former is appurtenant to the latter. As a 
result, individuals who do not own land adjacent to water courses cannot 
acquire property rights in the use of riparian water on their own. To access 
riparian flow, nonriparians need the cooperation of riparian owners.105 
Appropriative rights are organized differently. An appropriative right 
entitles a water user to appropriate a specific volume of flow she diverts and 
uses. In contrast with riparian rights, appropriative rights are not appurtenant 
to property rights in riparian land. At common law, people who divert flow 
from water courses establish appropriative rights in that flow; the common 
law makes the diversion, but not the possession of riparian land, a require-
ment of prior appropriation.106 Appropriative rights are allocated on the ba-
sis of seniority. The first appropriator gets first opportunity to divert and use 
water to satisfy her claim, and each successive appropriator gets an oppor-
tunity to satisfy his claim as long as enough water remains to satisfy it.107 
Appropriative rights are subject to a requirement of beneficial use. A pro-
spective appropriator must deploy diverted water to some beneficial use to 
acquire a property right, and she must continue to deploy the water she is 
diverting to beneficial uses to preserve her right.108 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 132–36 (Ark. 1955); see Joseph W. Dellapenna, Intro-
duction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 6.01(b). 
 105 See Little v. Kin, 644 N.W.2d 375, 378–81 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that nonripari-
ans need easements or approval to access riparian flow). 
 106 See Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1231–32 (Colo. 2001) (up-
holding a ditch easement based on a conditional water right). The common law rights described in 
text have been superseded in many jurisdictions by statutory permitting systems. On the common 
law diversion requirement and permitting systems, see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER 
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5.67, at 345–348 (2018). 
 107 See Taiawagi Helton & Rhett Larson, Elements of Prior Appropriation, in 1 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 12.01 (outlining the elements of the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. 
REV. 1, 7–8 (1997) (discussing the levels of water appropriation). 
 108 See Helton & Larson, supra note 107, § 12.02(c)(2). 
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When an appropriative right is perfected, the appropriator also acquires 
ditch easements in relation to the land crossed by the appropriated water.109 
A ditch easement entitles the appropriator not only to a right to send water 
across burdened land but also to a right to “do whatever is reasonably nec-
essary to permit full use and enjoyment of the easement[,] including the 
exercise of rights of ingress and egress for maintenance, operation, and re-
pair.”110 Ditch easements are thus appurtenant to the appropriative rights 
they service. In addition, such easements make appropriative rights “domi-
nant” or “benefiting” estates, and they make the lots subject to them “servi-
ent” or “burdened” estates.111 The responsibilities associated with a ditch 
easement run with ownership of the burdened estate, whether or not deeds 
conveying that estate give successors notice of the easement.112 
C. The Proprietary Character of Water Rights and Ditch Easements 
In scholarship about property concepts, the rights introduced in the last 
Section are not discussed nearly as often as fees simple, rights of absolute 
ownership, or the rights canvassed in Section I.D.113 But they could be. On 
one hand, in law, all of these rights are regarded as being property rights. 
Riparian rights are described in case law as “property.”114 Leading cases on 
appropriative rights hold that there is a “right of property in water,” namely 
a “usufructuary” right focusing “not so much of the fluid itself as [of] the 
advantage of its use.”115 And a recent Colorado ditch easement case holds 
“that ditch easements are a property right that the burdened estate owner 
may not alter absent consent of the benefitted owner.”116 And all of these 
rights trigger legal consequences clearly associated with property—like the 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Roaring Fork Club, 36 P.3d at 1232 (discussing ditch easements). 
 110 Osborn & Caywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 383 (Colo. App. 1983), quoted in 
Roaring Fork Club, 36 P.3d at 1232. 
 111 See Roaring Fork Club, 36 P.3d at 1233–34 (citing case law describing the relationship 
easements create between the dominant and servient estates). 
 112 See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446–47 (1882). 
 113 Though Eric T. Freyfogle discussed riparian rights in such a spirit, in Context and Accom-
modation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1989). 
 114 Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 83 A.2d 177, 184 (Conn. 1951); Evans v. Merriweather, 
4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 494 (1842). 
 115 United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167–68 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (internal quota-
tion omitted)). 
 116 Roaring Fork Club, 36 P.3d at 1234; accord Stamatis v. Johnson, 224 P.2d 201, 204 (Ariz. 
1950) (describing a prescriptive ditch easement as a “property right[]”). 
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presumption that ongoing interference with a property right entitles the pro-
prietor to equitable protection.117 
On the other hand, water rights and ditch easements raise the same is-
sues as those raised by the concurrent interests and nonpossessory rights 
discussed in Section I.D. If the “castle” metaphor is the paradigm by which 
property rights are measured, that paradigm does not fit riparian rights, ap-
propriative rights, or ditch easements. But we can understand why water 
rights and ditch easements are property—and how they can remain property 
when they differ from one another—if we study them attentive to the func-
tion they have been expected to perform. In the rest of this Part, I hope to 
trace the role that a function seems to have played in the development of 
water rights and ditch easements. 
As relevant here, a function serves as an ordering principle for proper-
ty doctrine. In many fields of law, the most fundamental “law” is not any 
particular black-letter rule but one or a few principles held to be both con-
trolling and valuable. When a particular statute or judicial opinion deviates 
from such principles, it seems out of alignment with the field of law and is 
likely to be repudiated.118 Seminal water rights decisions relied heavily on 
one such principle. The case most responsible for recognizing ditch ease-
ments was Yunker v. Nichols, an 1872 case by the (then-territorial) Colorado 
Supreme Court.119 In his opinion, Chief Judge Hallett acknowledged that 
ditch easements were likely to seem novel and contrary to the law of Eng-
land and already-established American states. Yet he argued: “The princi-
ples of the law are undoubtedly of universal application, but some latitude 
of construction must be allowed to meet the various conditions of life in 
different countries.”120 In the rest of this Part, I want to show how the “prin-
ciples of law” Hallett assumed to be fundamental to property helped generate 
different property regimes for the same resources in different climatic and 
hydrological conditions. The principles Hallett invoked constitute a function. 
                                                                                                                           
 117 On riparian rights, see, for example, Adams, 83 A.2d at 183–84 (describing narrowly the 
circumstances in which a court of equity should refrain from entering an injunction preventing 
interference with riparian rights). On appropriative rights, see, for example, Farmers High Line 
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 204 (Colo. 1999) (directing a lower court 
to enter an injunction protecting one appropriator if the facts showed that a second appropriator 
had expanded its use beyond its appropriative claim). On ditch easements, see Stamatis, 224 P.2d 
at 204 (affirming the entry of a mandatory injunction against efforts to relocate an irrigation 
ditch); Roaring Fork Club, 36 P.3d at 1234–38 (modifying a prior rule that the owner of a bur-
dened estate may not unilaterally move a ditch easement, but still entitling the holder of a ditch 
easement to protection in equity subject to equitable balancing). 
 118 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–31 (1978); EDWARD 
HIRSCH LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–6 (2d ed. 2013). 
 119 Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551 (1872). 
 120 Id. at 552–53 (opinion of Hallett, C.J.). 
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That function is one of many functions around which a property concept 
might be organized, and it seems influential in Anglo-American common law. 
D. The Emergence of Riparian Rights 
There is no scholarly consensus now about how riparianism came to 
predominate in nineteenth century law (in the United States or England), or 
about what sources contributed most to its development.121 As far as we 
know, there was no such consensus in early nineteenth century legal author-
ities, either. Different authorities suggested that different fundamental rules 
distributed access to riparian water. Nevertheless, American state and feder-
al courts harmonized those authorities into what became the riparian rights 
regime. And as they did so, they assumed that the principle fundamental for 
their purposes was an imperative to assign water in a manner that facilitated 
its use and enjoyment. This imperative to facilitate use structured water 
rights as we would expect a function to structure different instances of an 
artifact. 
Some early authorities suggested that riparians were entitled to natural 
flow. In these sources, “natural” meant “literally uninterrupted”; i.e., “any 
interference with th[e] flow [of water in its natural channel] was . . . ‘artifi-
cial,’ and therefore impermissible.”122 In an 1805 New York Supreme Court 
decision, Palmer v. Mulligan, Judge Livingston rejected an argument in fa-
vor of the natural flow regime. To evaluate the argument, Livingston ap-
pealed to the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or “use your own 
so that you don’t injure someone else’s.” Livingston insisted that the maxim 
be construed practically. That rule prevented mere “little inconveniencies” 
to existing riparians, it threatened to give them “exclusive right[s]” blocking 
later riparians’ gainful activities, and it threatened to “deprive[]” the public 
“of the benefit which always attends competition and rivalry.”123 Livingston 
thus construed the relevant law to require analysis whether the parties’ uses 
                                                                                                                           
 121 For surveys of the emergence of riparianism, see JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WA-
TER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW (2004); Arthur Maas & Hiller B. Zobel, Anglo-American Water 
Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine?, 10 PUB. POL’Y 109 (1960); Carol M. Rose, En-
ergy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 
(1990); Samuel C. Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 
(1919). 
 122 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 35 
(1977); see, e.g., Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460, 463 (1795) (“The water flows in its natural chan-
nel . . . [and] cannot legally be diverted from its course without the consent of all who have an 
interest in it.”). For legal authorities on riparian relationships, see Lawrie v. Silsby, 56 A. 1106, 
1108–09 (Vt. 1904) (repudiating natural flow principles and endorsing reasonable use principles); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 & cmt. b & reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 123 Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (opinion of Livingston, J.). 
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were reasonable—“to secure [both] to individuals the free and undisturbed 
enjoyment of their property, as to the public the benefits which must fre-
quently redound to it from such use.”124 In other words, Livingston regard-
ed an imperative to facilitate the use of surface water as fundamental. Liv-
ingston relied on that imperative to decide how to construe and read au-
thorities on natural flow. 
Other early authorities suggested that water rights are acquired by pri-
or occupancy—i.e., the principles of acquisition pointing toward the appro-
priative rights doctrine.125 Yet another 1818 New York decision, Platt v. 
Johnson, limited the scope of occupancy rules. “The elements being for 
general and public use,” Chief Justice Thompson reasoned, “occupancy[-
based appropriation rules] must be regulated and guarded, with a view to 
the individual rights of all who may have an interest in their enjoyment; and 
the [Sic utere] maxim . . . must be . . . construed with an eye to the . . . rights 
of all.”126 Whatever black-letter authority occupancy rules had, that authori-
ty was contingent on the rules’ respecting “the individual rights of all who 
may have an interest in their enjoyment.”127 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story handed down what is now 
regarded as the seminal riparian rights case, the 1826 decision Tyler v. Wil-
kinson.128 Story began by assuming that the owner of riparian land “has a 
right to the use of the water flowing over [the submerged land] in its natural 
current, without diminution or obstruction.”129 Yet Justice Story also antici-
pated and rejected the natural flow principle. Because the effect of that 
principle “would be to deny any valuable use of” the water flow, it was 
more just to protect “a reasonable use.”130 Justice Story insisted that these 
correlative riparian rights followed as a “necessary result of the perfect 
equality of right among all the proprietors of that, which is common to 
all.”131 To establish what controlling water law held, Justice Story recon-
ciled different lines of precedent as seemed likely to facilitate a “reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id. Judge Livingston’s (sole) opinion relied the least on precedents and the most on fun-
damental property principles of all the opinions in favor of the reasonable use rule. See id. at 315–
21. 
 125 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *402–03. 
 126 Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Joseph W. Dellapen-
na, The Right to Consume Water Under “Pure” Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 7.01 (stating that Story’s opinion can be seen as “the basis of reasona-
ble use theory of riparian rights”). 
 129 Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id.; see also Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 422–24 (1874) (same); Evans, 4 Ill. at 
494–95 (same); GETZLER, supra note 121, at 274–75 (same). 
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use” of water on terms “common to all.”132 As it had for Judge Livingston 
and Chief Justice Thompson, that imperative gave Justice Story a function 
by which to review and harmonize existing water law decisions. 
E. The Emergence of Appropriative Rights 
Prior appropriation rights emerged in the arid American West in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.133 We can study the decisive and best-
known state appropriation cases, out of Colorado:134 Yunker, and Coffin v. 
Left Hand Ditch Co.135 Yunker recognized ditch easements as property 
rights that could arise without prior creation by the owners of the estates 
servient to the easements.136 Because Yunker presented a dispute between an 
appropriator and the owner of land subject to an irrigation ditch, the case 
did not itself recognize appropriative rights. But Yunker’s decision to recog-
nize ditch easements made no sense unless appropriative rights were al-
ready part of the law of the land. A decade later, Coffin confirmed that as-
sumption.137 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474. 
 133 For an economic account of the emergence of appropriative rights, see Rose, supra note 121, 
at 290–93. For an intellectual history stressing the role that fairness-based concerns played in this 
emergence, see DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012). For an account of the role that natural 
law played in the emergence of appropriative rights, see Robert W. Adler, Natural Resources and 
Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124428 [https://perma.cc/FP6V-LJP5]. 
 134 For other cases instituting appropriative rights (or, recognizing appropriative rights doc-
trines as faits accompli) on grounds similar to those discussed in this Section, see United States v. 
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702–04 (1899); Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.) 670, 683–84 (1874); Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453, 455–56 (Ariz. 1888); Thorp v. Freed, 1 
Mont. 651 (1872); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 51 P. 674, 677–79 (N.M. 
1898); Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 318–21 (Nev. 1889); 
Stowell v. Johnson, 26 P. 290, 291 (Utah 1891); Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845, 847–48 (Wyo. 
1896). 
 135 See Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446; Yunker, 1 Colo. at 551. Coffin was decided by the Colorado 
Supreme Court after Colorado’s statehood. 
 136 In Yunker, three judges rendered three separate opinions. All agreed that the ditch ease-
ment in the case was valid, but they differed on the grounds. Chief Judge Hallett believed that the 
easement had been authorized pursuant to a territorial statute. Yunker, 1 Colo. at 553–55 (opinion 
of Hallett, C.J.). Judge Belford believed that the easement had been made irrevocable because of 
landowner conduct creating conditions for estoppel. Id. at 555–69 (opinion of Belford, J.). Judge 
Wells believed that the easement arose via the same fundamental common law principles that 
justify easements by necessity for landlocked parcels. Id. at 569–70 (opinion of Wells, J.). Those 
disagreements notwithstanding, Yunker is now read as authorizing the creation of ditch easements 
not granted by the owners of the estates servient to the easements. See, e.g., Roaring Fork Club, 
36 P.3d at 1232 (quoting Yunker, 1 Colo. at 555 (opinion of Hallett, C.J.), for the proposition that 
“all lands are held in subordination to the dominant right of” appropriators). 
 137 See Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446–47. 
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The judges who decided Yunker and Coffin appreciated full well how 
radically they were departing from riparian rights principles.138 Those judg-
es justified the shift they confirmed on the ground that Colorado differed 
from England and eastern states in climate and hydrology. In Yunker, Chief 
Judge Hallett granted that riparian principles seemed applicable in the hu-
mid American east on the ground that there “rain falls upon the just and un-
just” alike; he found those principles inapplicable to a “dry and thirsty land” 
such as Colorado.139 Similarly, in Coffin, Justice Helm held appropriative 
rights “[i]mperative” in the arid West, on the ground that “[w]ater in the 
various streams . . . acquires a value unknown in moister climates.”140 
When these judges cited facts about climate and hydrology, however, 
they did so by situating those facts in relation to the imperative that had 
been decisive in seminal riparian cases—the imperative to facilitate use. As 
Chief Judge Hallett explained in his opinion in Yunker, “[t]he value and use-
fulness of agricultural lands, in [an arid] territory, depend upon the supply 
of water for irrigation, and this can only be obtained by constructing artifi-
cial channels through which it may flow over adjacent lands.”141 Similarly, 
in Coffin, Justice Helm discredited the riparian rights regime in the course 
of describing it—as a doctrine “giving the riparian owner a right to the flow 
of water in its natural channel . . . even though he makes no beneficial use 
thereof.”142 Helm argued that the appropriative rights regime was preferable 
because it “encourage[d] the division and use of water in this country for 
agriculture.”143 Hallett and Helm reached the same conclusions by reason-
ing in terms of “necessities.”144 When they spoke of necessity, however, 
Hallett and Helm stated a conclusion that some people’s interests in using 
water were far stronger than others’ interests.145 In the humid east, nonripar-
ians had only weak interests in riparian water because rain water gave them 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See id. (insisting that “the common law doctrine giving the riparian owner a right to the 
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sufficient access to fresh water. In arid parts of the west, water courses con-
stituted the main sources of fresh water. There was a necessity to encourage 
the appropriation of water from water courses because all citizens had ex-
tremely urgent interests in acquiring fresh water for their own uses. 
In Tyler and other seminal riparian rights cases, courts followed and 
harmonized earlier cases by reconciling their holdings to a fundamental 
principle.146 Under that principle, water rights needed to be structured as 
seemed likely to facilitate the beneficial use of water. But riparian rights 
doctrine remained controlling law only when it seemed likely to facilitate 
such beneficial use. When riparianism seemed unlikely to facilitate such 
use, it came to lose legal authority in arid western states—and gave way to 
the prior appropriation doctrine. 
*   *   *   *   * 
Let me review what this Part has shown. Riparian and appropriative 
rights resemble one another in ways that different instances of a common 
artifact sometimes do. Analog and speaking clocks possess similar forms in 
that they both consist of machines; so too riparian and appropriative rights 
resemble one another in consisting of nonpossessory rights of some mini-
mal strength. Analog and speaking clocks also resemble one another in tell-
ing time; so too riparian and appropriative rights resemble one another in 
being structured with a view toward facilitating some sort of use and/or en-
joyment. Given these similarities, we should inquire whether riparian and 
appropriative rights seem instances of one common concept—and whether 
that concept accounts for other property doctrines that seem otherwise diffi-
cult to explain. 
We will turn to those questions in Parts V and VI. To this point, how-
ever, I have said relatively little about conceptual analysis: how I under-
stand it, how it proceeds, and what we can reasonably expect to learn from 
it. To this point, I have focused on explaining why property law and schol-
arship might profit from conceptual analysis on the topics raised in Part I. I 
hope that this and the last Part have convinced readers that conceptual anal-
ysis may indeed shed light on those topics. Yet conceptual analysis is rife 
with misunderstanding in the best of circumstances.147 Before we turn to the 
particular concept that I hope to introduce, then, we should step back and be 
clear on what we should expect to learn from the analysis conducted later. 
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 147 See, e.g., BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 27 (7th ed. 2015) (describ-
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IV. ON CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
A. The Objects of Conceptual Analysis 
Let me start by explaining what I mean by a concept.148 A concept is a 
mental representation on which people rely as they perceive or transact with 
some aspect of life.149 Concepts operate between objects people encounter 
in life and the words by which they describe those objects. Consider the 
foot of an animal. That foot has a nature, and that nature can be studied (at 
least, in philosophy) with metaphysics. The word “foot” constitutes a term 
by which people refer to bodily extremities beneath legs,150 and that word 
can be studied with semantic analysis. In contrast with metaphysics and 
semantic analysis, conceptual analysis studies the mental representations on 
which people rely when they think, talk about, or act in relation to those 
extremities.151 
Because conceptual analysis focuses on representations of objects, it 
focuses on questions different from questions appropriate to metaphysics or 
semantics. When a concept of a foot represents feet incorrectly, conceptual 
analysis aims to understand the representation even with its mistakes. Or, 
when a concept of a foot focuses on some features of feet (the heel and 
toes) and abstracts from others (the bone structure), conceptual analysis fo-
cuses on the representation and the specific features that the representation 
makes salient. Conceptual analysis differs from semantic analysis because it 
explains not only “words alone” (as semantic analysis does) “but also . . . 
the practices in which [they] occur and that are designated by them.”152 Se-
mantic analysis shows that the noun “foot” has two definitions, one for ex-
tremities beneath legs and another for the lowest part of an object.153 By 
contrast, conceptual analysis explains why these two definitions are related 
                                                                                                                           
 148 This Section draws on Claeys, supra note 16, at 229–36. For other (and perhaps more) 
helpful explanations of the roles that concepts play in thinking about property, see PENNER, supra 
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 149 See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 18–20 (2009).  
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 151 See RAZ, supra note 149, at 20–24. 
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and why the latter definition constitutes an extension of the former by anal-
ogy.154 
As Section II.A explained, concepts are often classified as general or 
particular.155 Both general and particular concepts can be analyzed. At the 
beginning of this Section, I defined a concept as (my emphasis now) “a 
mental representation.” People in a community can develop many different 
particular concepts to represent and approximate an object, as a triangle can 
be represented by concepts for three-angled and three-sided figures.156 
As defined here, conceptual analysis is primarily descriptive. People 
take concepts for granted as they think, speak, and act. Conceptual analysis 
aims to clarify the parameters of the concepts people assume as they think, 
speak, or act. Since people apply concepts intuitively, sound conceptual anal-
ysis “captures what [concept users] really had in mind . . . but [can’t] formu-
late explicitly”157 when they apply a concept. Concepts have intensions (the 
analogues for concepts of definitions for words),158 and sound conceptual 
analysis supplies accounts of concepts’ intensions.159 Concepts also have ex-
tensions (domains covering all the objects to which different concepts ap-
ply),160 and sound conceptual analysis describes how the application of a 
concept to objects in its extension “meshes in a logically coherent way.”161 
B. Artifacts and Artifact Concepts 
When I introduced metaphysics, conceptual analysis, and semantics in 
the last Section, I illustrated with feet and various concepts of feet. That 
illustration will surely prompt many readers to protest: The natures of and 
concepts for feet are simpler and more determinate than the natures of and 
concepts for chairs, clocks, fiat currency—or property rights. Feet constitute 
a natural kind, a category of objects that exist independently from human 
beliefs, representations, or practices.162 Artifacts do not constitute natural 
kinds because (by definition) they are created by people for distinct func-
tions. As a result, many and probably most philosophers doubt that artifacts 
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have essences.163 Although this (mainline) skepticism has been challenged 
in recent scholarship,164 the natures of artifacts remain quite contested. 
Although artifacts do differ from other types of objects, we can still 
learn valuable lessons about their natures and the structures of the concepts 
that people use to represent them. In evidence law, judges often reject ar-
guments against proffered evidence on the ground that the arguments go not 
to the admissibility of the evidence but rather to its weight.165 Social philos-
ophers with heterodox views about artifacts make a similar point about the 
natures of artifacts and the structure of artifact concepts. In my opinion, 
these heterodox philosophers are correct. Artifacts do not have natures or 
essences if we mean by “natures” or “essences” permanent features or fea-
tures independent of human mental activity. But a “nature” or an “essence” 
could also mean a feature that explains in a satisfying and informative way 
why something is an instance of that which it is.166 If that is what is meant, 
artifacts do have essential or natural features. If nothing else, artifacts pos-
sess the functions they are expected to perform by their makers and users. 
Of course, communities may decide that they no longer value a func-
tion previously associated with an artifact, and they may choose to desig-
nate a new function as that artifact’s intended and proper function. But here 
is where we need to take to heart the distinction in analytical philosophy 
analogous to evidence law’s distinction between admissibility and weight. 
The function-dependency of an artifact makes its features contingent; the 
artifact “exists” as a particular combination of function and form to the ex-
tent that people continue to designate the relevant function as that artifact’s 
intended and proper function. From the fact that artifacts’ natures are con-
tingent on functions, however, it doesn’t follow that they lack natures. We 
learn informative and illuminating lessons about clocks when we grasp that 
they are expected to tell time—even if those lessons are contingent on peo-
ple’s refraining from regarding them as time-telling objects at some later 
date. In other words, this contingency should make analysts modest in what 
they should expect from metaphysical study or conceptual analysis. But that 
contingency does not make such study or analysis worthless. 
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The same contingency also reinforces a point made in the last Sec-
tion—that analysis of artifact concepts is primarily descriptive or explanato-
ry. To be sure, because artifacts are made to perform specific functions, one 
cannot (descriptively) explain them or their concepts without showing how 
those functions (normatively) guide their use. Nevertheless, as just ex-
plained, when one focuses only on analyzing artifact concepts, the norma-
tive implications can only be contingent.167 If a conceptual analysis demon-
strates that a concept for chairs is much clearer and coherent than is com-
monly believed, the demonstration makes the concept seem at least a little 
more legitimate than it seemed before. But it does not follow that readers 
are obligated to respect or embrace the concept. When a conceptual account 
reconciles speaking clocks to a concept covering all clocks, the account does 
not obligate people to agree that clocks are valuable objects unless it is ac-
companied by a satisfying argument why time-telling is a valuable activity. 
So too for property. Readers may and should reserve judgment on the 
concept of property I present in what follows. The concept is valuable only 
if its function is valuable. In what follows, I say enough to explain how the 
function operates and why it might promote valuable goals, but I do not 
claim to have offered a comprehensive argument that it does promote such 
goals. My main intention is to illustrate, in explanatory terms, why func-
tions may impart more structure to property concepts than contemporary 
property scholars now appreciate.168 
C. Likely Features of a Concept for Property 
In the last Section, I suggested that artifacts can have at least a few es-
sential or natural features. For any given artifact, the most important of 
those features is the function deemed intended for and proper to it. As Jona-
than Crowe explains, an artifact can be understood as “comprising the char-
acteristic function of the artifact plus other features salient to that kind.”169 
Such “other features might include characteristic properties related to mat-
ters such as appearance, structure, method of creation and mode of opera-
tion.”170 Even when those features are essential to an artifact, however, they 
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are explanatorily posterior to the function. The artifact constitutes an in-
strument, and the people in some community all understand the instrument 
as a formal tool for performing the function. Since they understand the arti-
fact’s forms in light of the function, the function explains why specific non-
functional features seem necessary.171 
Crowe’s basic account may apply only with difficulty to concepts for a 
field such as property. Different communities may choose to organize the 
field of property around different specific functions. They may also differ in 
how they understand the general coverage of property—what objects are 
covered by property rights, or what kinds of Hohfeldian jural relations suf-
fice to establish property. That is one of several reasons why I study (only) 
one particular concept of property in this Article; I hope that the study of 
one well-entrenched concept provokes scholars to consider which features 
seem necessary to any concept of property and which ones seem merely 
contingent. 
In the concept we’ll study here, there are four features. I enumerate 
them here in the order in which they are discussed in Part V. I also explain 
those four features by (loose) analogy to the features people associate with 
fiat currency. First and most fundamental is (a) the function. Fiat currency 
facilitates exchange by providing a government-approved medium of value; 
property rights must perform one or more functions relating to the distribu-
tion and use of ownable resources. Next comes (b) the subject matter. Fiat 
currency is made of several different typical substances, most often metal, 
cloth, or paper. By rough analogy, property rights apply at least to resources 
that are not people or faculties or attributes of people.172 Next comes (c) 
property’s conventionality or institutionality. Like fiat currency, property 
rights perform artifact functions by being accepted as instruments that coor-
dinate behavior in furtherance of those functions. And last comes (d) the 
form by which property is made obligatory. Fiat currency comes with a 
government seal, and this seal expresses an obligation that the currency 
must be accepted as having its designated commercial value. By rough 
analogy, property rights embody obligations for people not to interfere with 
others’ rights of prior access to and use of resources. 
Three of these features will probably seem familiar to this point: (a) 
the function; (b) the relevant subject matter; and (d) the obligation neces-
sary to constitute a property right. Feature (c), the conventionality or institu-
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tionality, may not seem so familiar. Let us consider that feature more close-
ly in the next Section. 
D. Institutional Status in Property 
In what follows, I refer to the conventionality I associated with feature 
(c) in the last Section as “institutional status.”173 Institutional status is cru-
cial to the operation of any system of property rights. Different concepts of 
property may differ about the functions they attribute to property or the pre-
cise forms and coverage to which they apply. Yet all systems of property 
operate assign institutional status to the obligations they recognize. 
The term “institutional status” comes from philosophical scholarship 
on artifacts and social life. Those philosophical fields differentiate so-called 
“institutional” artifacts from so-called “ordinary” artifacts. Ordinary arti-
facts perform their intended and proper functions without anyone’s accept-
ing or believing that they are meant to perform a certain role. By contrast, 
institutional artifacts perform their functions by coordinating behavior. An 
institutional artifact supplies a point of reference. People are obligated to 
accept an institutional artifact as an authoritative symbol for some function. 
An institutional artifact requires people to behave in designated ways, but it 
entitles them to rely on others’ behaving in similar ways. By participating in 
coordinated activity, people perform the artifact’s function.174 
Searle illustrates the distinction between institutional and ordinary arti-
facts via a wall.175 Any large wall can operate as an ordinary artifact, simply 
by keeping outsiders outside of the territory walled off. That tendency con-
stitutes an “ordinary” function, because no one needs to believe that the 
wall has any symbolic or social meaning for the wall to repel outsiders. Yet 
a wall can also serve as an institutional artifact. In the right circumstances, 
residents near a wall may come to regard it as a boundary marker. When 
people perceive a wall as declaring a “boundary,” outsiders recognize an 
obligation not to traverse the wall and insiders assume they are entitled to 
repel others who do traverse it. When people come to assume that an object 
symbolizes social obligations like these, the object possesses institutional 
status. Fiat currency also possesses institutional status. Social philosopher 
John Searle asks readers to think about all the concepts about which a trav-
eler from one country and a waiter in a café in another country need to meet 
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minds before the traveler can buy a beer from the waiter.176 In Searle’s sce-
ne, the customer and waiter both need to accept the currency as having 
commercial value. To drive the point home, Searle asks readers to imagine a 
counterexample in which a dog owner trains his dog to bring a dollar bill 
every time it wants to be fed.177 Concepts of dog food, order, and money do 
not inform the dog’s behavior—or make that behavior anywhere near as 
deliberate, self-reflective, or social as the behavior of the customer and the 
waiter. 
Property rights resemble boundaries and fiat currency in possessing in-
stitutional status. Property rights perform whatever functions are designated 
for them by being accepted and by instituting correlative obligations relat-
ing to resources. And institutional status makes property rights institutional 
artifacts. 
E. Property Studied from the Internal Point of View 
By now, many readers may be wondering: Why add vocabulary from 
artifact and social philosophy scholarship to property law? And why might 
that vocabulary illuminate features of property law or concepts? The short 
answer: the vocabulary introduced here helps focus attention on the rela-
tionship between a social concept and its claims to legitimate authority. So-
cial concepts raise a naïve but extremely serious question: whenever a so-
cial concept prevails in a community, why should any of that community’s 
members be obligated to use it? To say the same thing in a more pointed 
way, if some members of a community refuse to accept and use a concept, 
under what authority may other members who do accept and use the con-
cept demand that the deniers use it anyway—and sanction them if they do 
not use it? These legitimacy issues subtly shape how social concepts oper-
ate in practice. And a conceptual analysis is unsatisfying if it does not ac-
count for issues this fundamental.  
Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons,178 these themes do not get the 
attention they deserve in contemporary American property law scholar-
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ship.179 I address these themes, if only briefly, in this Section. As I do, I will 
introduce three more terms relevant to the conceptual account that follows: 
“legitimate authority,” “reasons,” and “interests.” 
When one studies social concepts from the perspective of a social or po-
litical theorist, they should seem problematic. On one hand, most people find 
it advantageous most of the time to have access to shared social concepts. 
Social concepts provide common points of mental reference. Those shared 
points of reference simplify thinking, communicating, and acting. This is the 
most powerful lesson of Searle’s café scene. 
On the other hand, it might not always be advantageous to any person 
to be bound by a shared concept. When people in a community choose one 
particular representation for a particular object or a field of activity, they 
forego alternative representations. These choices matter very much when 
dealing with controversial social and political topics. The concepts that 
communities settle on can legitimate some normative choices raised by an 
object or activity and delegitimize other possible choices. Imagine that peo-
ple in a community struggle over a concept for insurance as applied to 
health care. Some people favor market-provided health care, and they insist 
that insurance be represented as a contractual relation in which one party 
voluntarily agrees to compensate specified losses suffered by the other par-
ty. Other people favor universal health care, and they insist that insurance 
be represented as a relation in which one party is entitled to initiate such a 
compensation relation unilaterally. The first concept delegitimizes compul-
sory private insurance, the second legitimizes it, and we shouldn’t be sur-
prised if partisans in the community struggle with one another to entrench 
the particular concept each favors.180 
Nevertheless, in health insurance, property, and many other fields of 
life, people in any community need to establish shared concepts. When a 
concept is shared, however, “shared” is a polite way to say that it is compul-
sory. The compulsion can be social. In any community, some people may 
deputize themselves as social-norm enforcers and then shame or ostracize 
people who refuse to use a concept. The compulsion can also be political. If 
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someone refuses to follow a concept established in law, he exposes himself 
to criminal prosecution or civil litigation. 
These threats—of shaming, ostracism, jail, or liability—raise what I 
called the legitimacy problem and is more commonly called a problem of 
legitimate authority.181 On what grounds may communities establish some 
concepts and not others? And on what grounds may communities apply so-
cial sanctions or legal compulsion to people even when they conscientiously 
object to the concepts those communities want to adopt? 
This legitimacy problem might be studied in different ways. Many 
philosophical analyses of social and legal concepts have studied the prob-
lem relying on an analytical vocabulary focusing on interests.182 Although 
the word “interest” itself means different things in different contexts,183 one 
meaning should be familiar. This is the sense in which a partner has a stake 
in a partnership, or in which any individual has a stake in any common en-
terprise.184 This sense can be broadened to describe the interests that we 
have in our lives, our free use of resources, our friendships, our associa-
tions, and so forth. In this sense, an “interest” constitutes a distinguishable 
component of a person’s well-being.185 Since an interest contributes to a 
person’s well-being, it identifies something that its holder desires and pur-
sues without any additional motivation. Social obligations possess legiti-
mate authority when they serve the interests of the people whom they obli-
gate. 
Yet interests are not merely self-centered; they connect their holders to 
broader communities. Among other things, a claimant does not have a real 
interest unless she can convince others that the object of the interest is wor-
thy of respect. And for an interest to be worthy of respect, it must be justifi-
able to others on objective and critical grounds.186 So discussions of inter-
ests are often complemented in analytical philosophy by discussions of rea-
sons—justifications for practical courses of action that are rationally defen-
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sible and obligatory.187 In what follows, I rely on both terms; I refer to “rea-
son-based” interests.188 The “interests” in reason-based interests capture the 
ways in which social institutions need to consider the priorities of individu-
als; the “reasons” tied to those interests capture the ways in which individu-
al priorities need to be reconciled with one another and with common goals 
by rational moral standards. And a social obligation seems even more likely 
to possess legitimate authority if it serves subjects’ interests consistent with 
objective reasons that a mature observer would find obligatory. 
When we analyze a social institution in light of reasons, interests, and 
legitimacy, we study it from what is called in jurisprudence an “internal 
point of view.” H.L.A. Hart deserves pride of place for introducing this “in-
ternalist” perspective on legal and social concepts.189 As Hart explained, 
even when an analyst focuses on describing and explaining an institution 
regulating a group’s behavior, her analysis will not be complete without an 
“account [of] the way in which the group regards its own behavior.”190 That 
account requires an account of the precise senses in which the institution is 
rendered obligatory. But since the people in the group are free individuals, 
the obligations must be linked to their interests; since they are also rational 
agents, those obligations must also be justified by persuasive reasons.191 
Institutional artifact theory helps illuminate the same problems. The 
distinct contribution of that theory is to focus attention on the ways in 
which particular artifacts serve specific reason-based interests. For example, 
when the Soviet Union was collapsing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Moscow residents started using Marlboro cigarettes as black-market curren-
cy.192 In internalist terms, this example raises fascinating questions about 
legitimate authority. Why do people normally accept fiat currency? Why did 
Muscovites choose to disregard the ruble and switch to Marlboros? On what 
basis might they have insisted that other Muscovites inclined to use rubles 
accept Marlboros? An internalist answer runs as follows. People have a rea-
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son-based interest in having a reliable and secure medium of commercial 
value. That interest serves more general interests people have in entering 
into promises and in acquiring resources likely to improve their lives. Nor-
mally, a reliable currency enjoys legitimate authority because it serves such 
interests. In 1990-vintage Moscow, however, the ruble ceased to serve those 
interests and Muscovites ceased to accept it as their currency. Artifact theo-
ry completes this internalist answer, by connecting the relevant interests to 
the relevant function. When a fiat currency facilitates exchange, it serves 
people’s individual and reason-based interests in exchanging. So when ru-
bles ceased to seem reliable as currency, they lost their connection to the 
interests that usually give them the authority that justifies their use in ex-
change. 
In short, artifact theory and terminology help us analyze social institu-
tions in a manner extremely sensitive to the tension between those institu-
tions and their obligatory characters. As fiat currency shows, an institutional 
artifact establishes social and/or legal conventions to perform some desig-
nated function. One does not grasp all or the most important dimensions of 
such conventions unless one understands that they work by being obligato-
ry. And one cannot understand why they might seem obligatory without un-
derstanding whether or how they serve users’ interests. It seems overwhelm-
ingly likely, then, that the functions that institutional artifacts are expected 
to perform are structured to serve the reason-based interests of the people 
expected to accept them. 
And since property constitutes an institutional artifact, we now know 
what to look for in any particular property concept. As Section B explained, 
such a property may possess a function; as Section D explained, all property 
rights operate via institutional status. Although different functions may lead 
different property concepts to differ in their structures, as Section C explained 
functions can still justify and explain the distinct jural relations that particular 
property concepts establish. And now that we know what to look for, we can 
study the particular concept of a property right at work in Part III. 
V. A USE-FACILITATING CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
In what follows, I refer to the particular concept under study as a “use-
facilitating” concept of property. This concept makes fundamental a reason-
based interest people have in acquiring things for uses likely to promote 
survival or rational human flourishing. That interest applies (only) to re-
sources separate from the people capable of asserting rights and holding 
property—resources I describe here as “separable” resources. In some cir-
cumstances, that interest gives some claims of access and use with priority 
higher than anyone else. That priority-claim has a specific strength and 
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character; it constitutes an in rem and immunized claim-right. The concept 
studied here enforces that claim-right by conferring institutional status on it. 
Because use-facilitation constitutes a function, it supplies normative guid-
ance to prospective owners and non-owners. In short, in the concept intro-
duced in this Section, a property right refers in its focal sense to: an in rem 
and immunized claim-right, in relation to a separable resource, vested with 
institutional status in legal and social conventions, and structured as seems 
likely to facilitate the use of the separable resource and related resources. 
A. The Function of Property: Facilitating Use 
In the concept under study, the function of property rights is to facili-
tate the use of resources on terms that are beneficial for all. The function 
presumes that people find acceptable one or more natural law theories. The 
relevant natural law theories make fundamental flourishing, i.e., rational 
happiness. Such theories identify a distinctive goal for property systems. As 
John Finnis puts it, since “[t]he world’s resources pre-exist all of us, and 
since we are all fundamentally each other’s equals as persons the only rea-
sonably normative baseline is that all those resources are to be treated at all 
times as for the benefit of everyone.”193 When that baseline is fundamental, 
the function of property rights is to facilitate the beneficial use of resources, 
on terms giving all people reasonable opportunities to acquire access to re-
sources of their own. 
The “use” in this function needs to be understood precisely to avoid 
confusion. As a word in English, the primary meaning of “use” is probably 
something like “deploy something . . . to a particular purpose”—as in “the 
use of scissors to cut shapes out.”194 In prominent secondary meanings, 
however, “use” has several meanings more capacious than this primary 
sense.195 “Use” can refer to an entitlement to deploy something. (The use of 
someone else’s car.) It can refer to a deliberate pattern of deploying some-
thing in a productive way. (Making good use of spare time.)196 In the con-
cept under study, the “use” meant runs consistent with these secondary and 
more capacious senses. 
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“Use” has these capacious senses because it constitutes an activity in 
which people have a reason-based interest. When rational flourishing is 
fundamental to a moral theory, people have reason-based interests in engag-
ing in activities likely to produce flourishing. Among other interests, people 
have reason-based interests in acquiring resources likely to help them flour-
ish and in using those resources for their own particular projects for flour-
ishing. “Use” encompasses any purposeful, beneficial, and justifiable en-
gagement a person can have with an ownable resource.197 In what follows, 
when context requires I refer to this sense as “purposeful, beneficial, and 
sociable use.” 
Because use must be “purposeful,” a person who claims property in a 
resource must incorporate the resource into some serious project. A person 
cannot claim a right in a resource merely by playing with it or passing it by, 
and the claim one makes in a resource must “show enough seriousness of 
purpose to overbalance the community of things” that sets the background 
baseline against which property rights are measured.198 
Because use must also be “beneficial,” it requires that a user produce 
some minimal rational flourishing. Recall how, in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch 
Co., the Colorado Supreme Court discredited the riparian rights as a doc-
trine “giving the riparian owner a right to the flow of water . . . even though 
he makes no beneficial use thereof.”199 In context, the court evaluated the 
riparian rights doctrine by whether it helped people derive some minimal 
level of rational gratification from the water they diverted. Recall also how, 
in the riparian rights case Palmer, one judge construed relevant property 
rules by whether they seemed likely “to secure to individuals the free and 
undisturbed enjoyment of their property, as to the public the benefits which 
must frequently redound to it from such use.”200 The sense of use described 
here explains why that judge treated “use” and “enjoyment” interchangea-
bly. In this capacious sense, a person can derive use from flowing river wa-
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ter not only by drinking it or operating a mill but also by enjoying it for rec-
reational purposes. 
Finally, the use in this concept is “sociable” use. When the function 
under study allocates access to resources, this sociability requirement en-
sures that distributive concerns are considered. After all, when property 
rights are measured against a background baseline in which resources are 
prima facie for the benefit of everyone, the interest any one person can 
claim in using a resource needs to be reconciled with the correlative inter-
ests of others. Recall how, in the riparian rights case Platt v. Johnson, one 
judge argued that because “[t]he elements [are] for general and public use,” 
it followed that water rights “must be regulated and guarded, with a view to 
the individual rights of all who may have an interest in their enjoyment; and 
the [Sic utere] maxim . . . must be . . . construed with an eye to the . . . rights 
of all.”201 The judge linked riparian rights to use and enjoyment, but specif-
ically use and enjoyment consistent with “the rights of all.” Or, recall how, 
in Yunker v. Nichols, one judge contrasted the western U.S., where rain is 
scarce, with the eastern U.S., where “rain falls upon the just and unjust 
alike.”202 In context, that judge was saying that water rights were subject to 
implicit and inchoate distributive limitations. These limitations recognized 
the correlative claims of all state citizens to access to fresh water. In the 
humid east, those claims could justly be disregarded. Rainwater gave non-
riparians adequate access to fresh water. In the arid west, however, those 
correlative claims were extremely pressing. Given their pressing character, 
riparians’ rights in riparian water could justly be modified to recognize the 
stronger claims of nonriparian appropriators. 
To this point, we have clarified the sense in which, in the concept under 
study, property rights are expected to facilitate the use of ownable resources. 
But property rights are expected to facilitate the use not only of the resource 
specifically implicated by a property right; they are also expected to facilitate 
the use of resources commonly proximate to that resource. Here is another 
reason why water rights cases are so instructive. The seminal appropriative 
rights cases make clear that property in water and land are related to one an-
other. Riparian rights are classified as incidental or appurtenant to property in 
land. That classification reflects a few implicit judgments. Most important, if 
nonriparians had any sort of proprietary interests in riparian water, they would 
need ditch easements, and ditch easements would jeopardize all the uses of 
land facilitated by exclusive possession of land. Conversely, in appropriative 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); see supra note 126 and accom-
panying text. 
 202 Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872) (opinion of Hallett, C.J.); see supra note 151 
and accompanying text. 
48 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1 
rights regimes, appropriators do have ditch easements, notwithstanding their 
effects on nonriparian land. That classification reflects a distributive judgment 
that appropriative rights cases made explicit: that “the value and usefulness of 
agricultural lands . . . depend on the supply of water for irrigation.”203 In other 
words, the choices how to structure water rights implicated property rights in 
land. And better to qualify exclusive property rights in land, if such qualifica-
tions seemed likely to facilitate the gathering and distribution of fresh water 
making the land usable. 
When use-facilitation guides practical reasoning, it justifies and ex-
plains why property rights possess the nonfunctional features they possess. 
Since it is valuable to facilitate commercial exchange, it is justifiable to as-
sign to some ordinary objects institutional status such as money. As for fiat 
currency so too for property. The function of use-facilitation justifies prop-
erty rights’ possessing certain nonfunctional features. 
B. The Subject Matter of Property: Separable Resources 
The first nonfunctional feature consists of the subject matter of proper-
ty. For any artifact or artifact concept, a function constitutes a rule of 
thumb. When a community accepts some function as the intended and prop-
er function for an artifact, it presumes that the function’s goal is valuable 
and that a particular activity seems a reliable means to advance that goal. 
When such a rule of thumb is instituted as a conventional norm, however, 
the convention marks off bounds within which the rule seems reasonably 
likely to realize the goal. That is what the subject matter does for the con-
cept under study; it delineates the domain over which the concept of proper-
ty applies. 
James Penner has provided a helpful definition articulating that do-
main, and I rely on his definition here. In Penner’s formulation, property 
covers the field of separable resources. A resource is “separable” if it is as-
sociated only contingently or non-essentially with the person exercising the 
right in relation to the resource.204 This requirement assumes a more fun-
damental distinction between persons who are capable of exercising and 
claiming rights and objects separate from those persons. People are capable 
of claiming rights in various attributes of their persons—e.g., their identi-
ties, their bodies, or various faculties they possess. Because those attributes 
are essentially associated with the people exercising them, they give rise to 
“personality rich” rights—e.g., rights of reputation and identity, rights of 
bodily autonomy, and freedom of contract. By contrast, when a resource is 
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not tied essentially to the person intending to deploy it, the resource is an 
appropriate candidate for a property right. 
Separability supplies a rough-and-ready test marking off the domain of 
the concept under study. As the last Section explained, in the concept under 
study, property rights need to be structured to give individuals reasonable 
opportunities to acquire and use resources, each for her own rational flour-
ishing. This imperative seems reasonable enough as it applies to “resources” 
to which people are not already entitled. It does not seem reasonable as ap-
plied to attributes tied up with the identities of the people capable of pursu-
ing their individual well-beings freely and rationally. Separability keeps the 
field of property away from the persons and focused on non-personal re-
sources.205 
Separability illuminates why we find it clear that water rights and ditch 
easements fall in the field of property. These rights assign access to water 
and land, separable resources under any criterion for separability. Separabil-
ity also illuminates why some rights that are property rights in black-letter 
doctrine seem problematic property rights. Even though the right to control 
the use of one’s identity in endorsements (or, the “right to publicity”) is of-
ten treated as a property right,206 it seems an odd property right because it 
protects holders’ rights over outgrowths of their personas. 
C. The Conventionality of Property: Institutional Status 
Now that we grasp the field to which property rights apply, we can 
grasp the precise means by which property rights perform the use-
facilitating function described in Section A. In the concept under study, 
property rights facilitate use by establishing a conventional pre-commitment 
system. The field of property generates rights of a certain type when such 
rights seem reasonably likely to perform the function recounted in Section 
B. Property’s function is performed thanks to conventions, in law and social 
morality, that obligate people to respect the rights. 
Those legal and social obligations give property institutional status as 
explained in Section IV.C. By some combination of legal fiat and social ac-
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ceptance, a property right establishes an institutionalized norm. Such a norm 
obligates non-proprietors to recognize and respect others’ property rights, and 
it obligates proprietors to recognize and abide by the limitations on their 
rights. As long as the rights are structured as seems likely to facilitate use of 
the resources covered, these obligations coordinate people to perform proper-
ty’s function. 
Water law also illustrates how much traction institutional status has 
throughout property law. The systems recounted in Part III provide two dif-
ferent systems for coordinating interpersonal behavior in relation to land 
and river water. Although both of these systems get tested from time to 
time, most residents in riparian and appropriative communities follow the 
applicable legal principles most of the time. That is a powerful testament to 
the role that rules of property play in coordinating collectively intentional 
behavior. 
But water law also provides examples analogous to the cigarettes-for-
rubles story recounted in Section IV.E.207 Mid-nineteenth century, there 
were good reasons for believing that riparian principles were controlling 
law in many western territories before statehood. In any territories subject 
originally to English jurisdiction, the common law provided the fundamen-
tal law and the common law embraced riparian principles.208 And many 
early western territorial laws and state statutes did not “sound all that differ-
ent from those applied” in riparian states.209 Yet miners and other early set-
tlers came to believe that riparianism was wholly inappropriate for their 
local needs. As Yunker and Coffin showed, that judgment gave local resi-
dents a reasonable basis for arguing that “imperative necessity” justified 
applying property rules different from those applied in common law juris-
dictions.210 And as local residents came to settle on appropriative principles, 
those principles “practically swept away the common-law doctrine of ripar-
ian rights . . . long before a case actually arose between an appropriator of 
water . . . and a riparian claimant along the natural stream.”211 When courts 
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faced cases of first impression about access to riparian water, they conclud-
ed that local residents had instituted customs long acquiesced in—and that 
those customs had superseded riparian principles.212 Or (as in Coffin) they 
construed statutes that seemed to authorize riparian rights in ways that 
seemed inconsistent with the statutory language.213 
In short, before appropriative rights principles became entrenched, ri-
parian rights had partial institutional status thanks to the common law, while 
appropriative rights had partial institutional status via local customs and 
overwhelming popular support. The conflict between these two regimes 
needed to be settled. Once Coffin and other cases sided with appropriative 
rights, the appropriative rights regime possessed the complete institutional 
status expected of a paradigmatic property right. 
D. The Priority Established by Property: An In Rem and  
Immunized Claim-Right 
As the last Section suggested, since the concept under study establish-
es a rule of thumb, it facilitates use by assigning to one or more people a 
right of a certain presumptive strength and character. The right needs to be 
good against everyone else in the community, and it needs to be structured 
as seems reasonably likely to facilitate the relevant resource’s use. 
This claim of priority needs to be described more clearly than it has in 
recent scholarship. As Section II.C explained, I doubt that descriptions such 
as “exclusion,” “right to exclude,” “governance,” “institution,” or “right 
protecting a justified expectation” are as informative or illuminating as we 
should expect. We can do better, relying primarily on Hohfeld’s two-by-four 
taxonomy of jural relations.214 In analytical terms, the formal “right” neces-
sary for a property right consists of an in rem and immunized claim-right. 
When such a right is institutionalized, it also establishes correlative in rem 
duties and disabilities on non-proprietors.215 
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1. The Claim-Right 
The claim-right should be easy enough to appreciate. A property right 
confers some “claim against someone whose recognition as valid is called 
for by some governing rules or moral principles.”216 Within the activities 
covered by the right, the holder is entitled to be free from interference with-
out her authorization. The authority and the zone of non-interference can be 
quite wide, as they are in sole and absolute ownership of land or chattels. 
But neither the authority nor the zone of non-interference needs to be that 
wide. The authority and the zone of non-interference only need to be strong 
enough to say that the person entitled to both has a right to demand that 
others “recogni[ze them] as valid.”217 
Water rights and ditch easements illustrate how weak a property right 
can be while still remaining a “right” in the requisite sense. In a riparian 
rights state, riparians have rights that no one interfere with their uses of ri-
parian flow consistent with reasonable use norms. In an appropriative rights 
state, appropriators have rights not to be interfered with as they divert water 
consistent with their claims’ priorities. And appropriators also have rights 
not to be interfered with as they enter servient estates to inspect and main-
tain their irrigation ditches. To be sure, all of these claim-rights facilitate 
uses of land and water. Yet the uses are Hohfeldian privileges or liberties, 
and they are not recognized directly. They are instead protected indirectly, 
to the extent that they are consistent with (in riparian states) reasonable use 
norms or (in appropriative rights states) priority norms and the norms regu-
lating access to ditch easements. Those norms establish claim-rights and 
correlative duties. 
2. Immunities 
A claim-right is necessary but not sufficient to entitle someone to pri-
ority in access and use of a resource. For priority to be meaningful, the per-
son asserting priority needs security that the claim-right cannot be extin-
guished or undermined. Interferences with water rights and ditch easements 
are ordinarily protected in equity. That equitable protection makes it signifi-
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cantly more difficult for a non-proprietor to have a property right modified 
or destroyed than if the claim-right were unprotected and subject to change. 
In Hohfeld’s taxonomy, the claim-right is not subject to a liability (modifi-
cation or destruction by third parties) but rather protected by an immuni-
ty.218 That is why the “right” in a property right consists of an immunized 
claim-right. 
3. In Rem Rights and Obligations 
Not only is the relevant claim-right immunized, it is also structured in 
rem.219 To explain in remness, we must supplement Hohfeld’s analytical 
vocabulary. Hohfeld tried to define in rem rights as rights availing against a 
large and indefinite class of people.220 But that definition does not capture 
the normative guidance provided by in remness. The definition seems con-
sistent with a right-holder enjoying thousands of individual claim-rights 
against a wide range of individual duty-holders,221 and yet such rights would 
not be in rem rights. In some quarters, in remness is understood to describe a 
characteristic whereby a right is held in relation to a general and impersonal 
class of duty-holders.222 That characteristic describes one consequence of in 
remness but not in remness itself. 
In the sense relevant here, an obligation is an in rem obligation in a 
sense described by Peter Birks in terms of “exigibility.” “Exigibility” is a 
term of art describing whether a norm may be validly invoked and enforced. 
In Birks’s formulation, an obligation is in rem if its exigibility “is defined 
by reference to the existence and location of a thing, the res to which it re-
lates.”223 Birks introduced this requirement to describe obligations in resti-
tution; Penner applied it to property law. As Penner explained, a right is not 
in rem, and is instead in personam, if its exigibility requires “some refer-
ence to the actions, the intentions, or personal histories of the beneficiaries 
who are the correlative right-holders.”224 
The rights canvassed in Part III are in rem rights. When an appropriat-
ive right exists, other water prospectors owe a duty to respect appropriations 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See Hohfeld, supra note 57, at 55–59. 
 219 And the duties and disabilities correlative to these claim-rights and immunities are also in 
rem. 
 220 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1917). 
 221 See PENNER, supra note 17, at 25–27; Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 
322, 331–34 (1920). 
 222 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 178, at 360–63. 
 223 PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 49 (1985). 
 224 PENNER, supra note 17, at 28–29. But see Webb, supra note 215, at 257–63 (questioning 
Birks’s account of exigibility on the ground that it conflates separate usages of in rem). 
54 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1 
consistent with the appropriative claim. When a ditch easement exists, land 
owners owe a duty to abide by crossings consistent with the scope of the 
easement. Duty-holders do not need to know anything about the intentions, 
activities, or personal histories of the right-holders to grasp the duties they 
hold. Riparian rights may seem more difficult to classify, because no ripari-
an can discharge her duty of reasonable use without knowing what uses 
other riparians are making of water. Nevertheless, a riparian right and cor-
relative duties are still in rem. Someone potentially subject to a duty cor-
relative to riparian rights does not need to know personal information about 
particular riparians to know whether he owes the duty. The right-holder’s 
uses can only be relevant in a secondary sense, to determine whether the 
duty has been performed or violated.225 
E. Existence and Nondefectiveness Conditions in a Property Concept 
In short, in the concept under study, a property right possesses four 
features. First, the right is expected to perform the function of facilitating 
use of the resource covered and other proximate resources. The right (sec-
ond) establishes obligations in relation to one or more separable resources. 
The right performs its function (third) by being established with institution-
al status in law and social morality and (last) by consisting of at least one in 
rem and immunized claim-right.  
This account can be misunderstood, however, because the use-
facilitating function constitutes a kind of “feature” different from the three 
nonfunctional features. To see why, consider a criticism Thomas Merrill 
recently lodged against the concept under study here. Merrill denies that 
use-facilitation constitutes a necessary requirement for a property right. To 
the extent that property rights facilitate use, Merrill argues, they do so only 
“by giving owners the right to exclude others from the thing.”226 In other 
words, a right to exclude is necessary to property, and rights of use are de-
rivative because they are protected if at all by rights to exclude. 
This criticism mistakenly attributes to the concept under study two fea-
tures that it does not possess. To an extent, the criticism treats the “use” in 
the concept as equivalent to the uses protected by conventional rights of 
use, in fields of law like nuisance or water rights. As Section A should have 
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made clear, however, use serves a different role in the concept under study. 
Use identifies a valuable interest, one capable of justifying an individual 
right. That interest does not mandate any particular conventional right; it 
facilitates practical reasoning about property. 
Separately, the criticism assumes that a feature involving use must be 
necessary to a property right in the same sense in which three-sidedness is 
necessary to a triangle. Merrill calls the right to exclude a “sine qua non,”227 
and perhaps he assumes that any analytically-necessary feature must be 
necessary in the sense of being a sine qua non. Not so. When an object of 
metaphysical or conceptual analysis has a function, it is better to separate its 
constitutive features into two categories. Some features constitute sine qua 
non features—existence conditions, or features without which a particular 
instance cannot belong to the class for the object of study. But other features 
can be necessary in the sense of supplying a nondefectiveness condition for 
an object or concept.228 A nondefectiveness condition identifies the point of 
an object. (The point of a clock is to tell time mechanically.) That point, in 
turn, supplies practical guidance to decision makers as they determine how 
to design particular instances of the concept for particular resources and 
uses. (One or two-person seat-facilitation gives guidance to chair-makers as 
they design potential seats.) And that point supplies a measure, inherent in 
the concept, for evaluating whether a particular object is a successful or de-
fective instance of the concept. (Whether a currency seems reliable enough 
and free enough of depreciation to facilitate exchange.) 
Now that we have addressed both of the misunderstandings in Mer-
rill’s argument, we can appreciate precisely how use-facilitation informs 
property in the concept under study. Merrill assumes that I deny that exclu-
sion is necessary to property. I do not; the in rem and immunized claim-
right explained in the last Section constitutes a right to exclude of a sort. I 
claim, and Merrill seems to disagree, that a function is a constitutive feature 
of property concepts and that use-facilitation is constitutive of the concept 
under study here. Yet use-facilitation is necessary not as a sine qua non but 
rather as a nondefectiveness condition for property. Indeed, because it sup-
plies property with a nondefectiveness condition, use-facilitation is more 
important than the exclusion or claim-right necessary for property. When a 
concept is organized around a function, the function is explanatorily prior to 
the concept’s nonfunctional features. Merrill may even agree about this pri-
ority. Recall that he argues that property encourages use “by giving owners 
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the right to exclude others from the thing.”229 That is exactly what a func-
tion would be expected to do for a property concept. The function of a 
property concept guides people’s practical reasoning how to tailor the for-
mal exclusion that a property right provides.230 
And once again, water rights doctrines illustrate. Because rain satisfies 
people’s interests in fresh water in humid states, no one has strong interests 
in access to water courses. By default, the use-interests that seem valuable 
in such states are the interests of riparian landowners in security of land and 
the interests that all state residents have in keeping water courses intact for 
any public uses. That is why riparian rights tie property in riparian rights to 
property in riparian land. By contrast, in arid states, no one has easy access 
to fresh water and everyone has an urgent interest in seeing to it that fresh 
water gets collected. Because the practical guidance is different, the claim-
rights are stronger, nonriparians get equal opportunity to appropriate water 
on a par with riparians, and the property in water rights is severed from 
property in riparian land. 
It is also extremely telling that riparian and appropriative legal systems 
institute only enough exclusion to establish usufructuary property rights. 
When a resource is susceptible to a dominant use and a secondary use, a usu-
fruct provides a reliable instrument by which to protect and encourage the 
secondary use without jeopardizing the dominant use. In some cases, the 
dominant use may be a public use carried on in a public commons. By pro-
tecting (mere) usufructuary private property in riparian flow, riparian rights 
do not interfere with navigation and other valuable public uses of navigable 
rivers.231 In other cases, the dominant use may be a second private use. That 
possibility explains the structure of ditch easements. An appropriator’s inter-
est in transporting water may take priority over a neighbor’s interest in priva-
cy and all the uses that privacy interest protects. But the former interest 
doesn’t entitle the appropriator to ignore all the interests neighboring land 
owners have in their lots. Ditch easements respect appropriators’ interests 
without extinguishing the interests of the holders of servient estates. Again, 
water rights and ditch easements constitute property rights because they rec-
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ognize and protect in rem and immunized claim-rights. But the claim-rights 
are structured as seems reasonably likely to perform the function of facilitat-
ing use as described in Section A. The claim-rights facilitate use of the water 
by giving appropriators secure expectations that they will have access to the 
water they have appropriated; the claim-rights facilitate use of the servient 
estates by not sweeping as broadly as the rights that establish fees simple. 
F. A Concept as a Focal Meaning (Herein of Family Resemblances, 
Necessary Features, and Sufficient Features) 
Before we close our survey of the concept under study, some readers 
may wonder about its scope. Scholars often assume that there are two main 
ways to account for concepts. One is to identify in a concept features neces-
sary and/or sufficient to designate instances of it; the other is to situate dif-
ferent objects that relate to a concept in reference to family resemblances 
and dissimilarities.232 Am I then claiming that the features recounted in Sec-
tions A through D are strictly necessary for property rights—in all their ap-
plications? 
No. The question just posed assumes a false dichotomy.233 Conceptual 
analysis can also proceed by way of other analytical methods. One of the 
alternatives consists of analysis of “focal meaning.” As Section II.B 
showed, when Merrill and Smith propose their (normative) accounts of ex-
clusionary property, both rely on so-called core-periphery methods. Similar 
methods have been called (by Hart) “central case” methods,234 and (by Jo-
seph Raz) definition in relation to “typical cases.”235 Finnis describes the 
same basic method as specification in relation to a “focal meaning,”236 and I 
follow Finnis’s terminology here.237 
We shouldn’t be surprised that the concepts representing artifacts often 
are structured around a focal meaning. When a concept supplies a shorthand 
reference for a presumptive strategy, it obligates only when the conditions 
justifying the strategy seem applicable. When someone wants a chair solely 
for decorative purposes, she wants an object that isn’t consistent with the 
intended proper function for chairs as understood by most chair-users. A 
focal meaning approach keeps the assessments we make of ornamental 
chairs coherent with the assessments we make about ordinary chairs. 
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So too for the property concept under study. The three nonfunctional 
features recounted in Sections A through D are all focal features of a prop-
erty right only if and to the extent that it seems desirable to facilitate the use 
of external resources by maintaining in rem and immunized claim-rights 
over those resources. Contingent on that normative premise, if and when 
rights of publicity are regarded as property rights, they seem borderline or 
defective property. This conceptual classification helps us make a quick 
normative presumption: it seems troubling to assign property rights over 
personal identity. Property norms may not adequately protect nonconven-
tional rights of personality, and they may also undermine such rights by en-
couraging people to view one another’s personas as objects of commercial 
exploitation. Similarly, while it was uncertain whether riparian rights com-
mon law norms or appropriative rights customs had priority in Colorado 
and other states, water rights were borderline property rights. In that period 
of uncertainty, no water rights possessed full institutional status.  
For this Article’s purposes, however, we do not need to dwell very 
long on focal meanings and borderline cases. As Section I.D suggested, in 
recent debates, scholars who favor bundle and Progressive views have re-
lied heavily on easements, mortgages, running covenants, and legal interests 
in tenancies in common. We do not need to dwell overlong on borderline 
cases to analyze these doctrines. In the right conditions, all four of these 
property rights constitute focal instances of the concept introduced in this 
Part. In the next Part, I explain why. 
VI. FOUR TEST CASES RECONSIDERED 
A. Legal Interests in Tenancies in Common 
Consider first legal interests in tenancies in common. The best inroad 
to studying cotenancy interests comes from a discussion of them in a recent 
chapter by Munzer. Imagine that an estate called Crosswinds is held by 
Amy and three sisters as tenants in common. Munzer asks readers to com-
pare two statements: “Crosswinds is the property of Amy and her three sis-
ters,” and “Amy has the right to exclude others from Crosswinds.”238 An 
“acute” lawyer, Munzer argues, would “immediately pick out an ambigui-
ty,” namely that the right to exclude in the latter statement does not specify 
which people Amy may exclude.239 
This hypothetical illustrates perfectly why property scholars need to 
explore both of this Article’s main suggestions. Munzer uses the hypothet-
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ical to challenge an exclusion view.240 He seems to assume that, if he refutes 
exclusion views, he restores the scholarly status quo ante, the “domi-
nat[ing]” view whereby “property is a bundle of sticks.”241 But Munzer’s 
conclusion does not follow from his argument. Even if Munzer has refuted 
exclusion views,242 he has not demonstrated that property rights consist only 
of bundles of thing-related rights. Property law could operate with two or 
more general organizing concepts. Munzer has only proven that one relevant 
concept does not apply to legal interests in tenancies in common. He has not 
even considered whether there exists a second concept covering cotenancy 
interests and nonpossessory property rights. 
Second, since Munzer does not consider that there might be a second 
general concept for property, he does not consider the specific possibility that 
such a concept might be organized around an artifact function. This oversight 
is unfortunate, because such a concept can supply exactly the normative 
guidance Munzer finds missing from exclusion views. Munzer argues that 
an “acute” lawyer intuitively applies the term of art “property” differently in 
different contexts. Yet an artifact function could supply Munzer’s lawyer 
with the practical guidance Munzer believes she needs. 
To see why, insert into Munzer’s hypothetical the concept introduced 
in the last Part. In any community in which that concept prevails, Munzer’s 
hypothetical expresses in lay English something like the following: 
“Crosswinds consists of a collection of in rem and immunized claim-rights, 
held by Amy and her three sisters as tenants in common, and structured as 
seems likely to facilitate their and others’ beneficial uses of the co-owned 
estate.” Since the person in Munzer’s hypothetical is a lawyer, however, she 
may read the hypothetical using terms of art more familiar to property law-
yers: “Crosswinds consists of rights of exclusive use held by Amy and her 
sisters as tenants in common.” Both interpretations signal that Amy and her 
sisters have claim-rights that are irrevocable to a certain degree. The im-
munized claim-rights confirm as much in the analytical rendition of the 
statement; the terms “rights” and “exclusive” supply the same confirmation 
in the legal rendition. Crucial here, however, both statements signal that the 
irrevocable rights are contingent on some interests in use. Both signal that 
the rights and irrevocability need to be tailored—as seems likely to perform 
property’s use-facilitating function. That signal supplies the normative 
guidance that bundle views claim property concepts do not supply. In the 
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process of supplying that guidance, that signal also performs the sort of so-
cial function cherished by scholars supportive of Progressive property. 
To see why, we need to consider the institutional details of tenancies in 
common more closely than we have to this point. In practice, tenants in 
common most often make decisions about the management and use of their 
co-owned land by discussion and agreement.243 When they do so, they hold 
and exercise over their co-owned lot the rights that a sole owner holds in a 
lot held in fee simple sole ownership. When cotenants use lots separately, 
most often they do so consistent with a model I call here the “ordinary” 
model of tenancy in common. In an ordinary cotenancy, every cotenant “has 
the right to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or she were the sole 
owner, limited only by the same right in the other cotenants.”244 In such a 
cotenancy, no cotenant may eject the others, and no cotenant has claims on 
the benefits the other cotenants extract from the premises. In a few cases, 
however, one cotenant occupies the premises exclusively and denies the 
other cotenants reentry. Such occupancy and denial is called “ouster,” and I 
describe the rights and obligations that emerge when one cotenant ousts 
others as an “ouster model.” In the ouster model, the cotenant in possession 
is not obligated to readmit the cotenants out of possession, but he is obligat-
ed to provide the ousted cotenants with an accounting and with profits pro-
rated to their cotenancy interests.245 
A use-facilitating concept explains why all three regimes exist and 
why each makes a distinct contribution to property practice. The fee simple 
held in sole ownership, the ordinary regime, and the ouster regime all insti-
tute property rights with the features recounted in Part V. Cotenancy rights 
satisfy the institutional status requirement; they do so simply by constituting 
a familiar class of property interests with distinct attributes and conse-
quences. Furthermore, even though various cotenancy rights differ from one 
another, they all constitute in rem and immunized claim-rights. These rights 
are all in rem interests because they all run with the land held in common. 
These rights also include claim-rights. Rights to occupy and use some of the 
premises or (in the alternative) to receive profits via accounting—are claim-
rights. And these rights are immunized. Cotenants lack authority to extin-
guish one another’s rights to an accounting or to occupancy and use. If co-
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tenants choose to exit a tenancy in common, governing law entitles them to 
easy access to a partition; if they want to take some of the co-owned land as 
they exit, under governing principles of equity the premises are partitioned 
in kind and not by sale unless such a partition is unworkable.246 
Finally, not only do the rights that arise in ordinary and ouster regimes 
possess the forms we expect of typical property rights, they seem structured 
in ways likely to perform the function typically associated with those forms. 
The solely-owned fee simple facilitates use for people who want to deploy 
property to their own individual projects. By contrast, cotenancies facilitate 
use among people who find it conducive to their rational well-being to as-
sociate with one another in close quarters. Members of the same family may 
derive gratification from associating with one another. So may people who 
are not related to one another but still share common religious, ideological, 
aesthetic, or other views about the desirability of common living. The living 
out of a shared way of life on a lot constitutes a purposeful and beneficial 
use of land, and a cotenancy arrangement facilitates such use. 
An ouster arrangement seems a sensible arrangement for a third sce-
nario. In this scenario, many cotenants hold joint interests, only a few of 
them are interested in managing the premises actively, and the rest are inter-
ested only in deriving passive benefits. In such a scenario, it may be appro-
priate to structure cotenancies as trusts structure the rights and obligations 
between trustees and beneficiaries. And the triggering condition for this ar-
rangement—that other cotenants be absent and one cotenant oust them—
seems a rough but reasonable proxy for the conditions in which cotenants 
seem comfortable accepting such an arrangement.247 
Of course, as Section V.A stressed, use needs to be understood socia-
bly. In tenancies in common, then, the uses of cotenants may not jeopardize 
interests that outsiders have in the premises held in common. Here, the main 
interests are those of lenders, insurers, prospective buyers, and other parties 
who need notice that land is owned jointly and concurrently. Yet these inter-
ests can be accommodated through recording requirements. 
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B. Easements (and Revocable Licenses) 
As the last Section showed, legal interests in tenancies in common 
highlight features of property rights that bundle views seem incapable of 
explaining. Servitudes highlight features of property rights that exclusion 
views seem incapable of explaining.  
Consider easements first. On one hand, Merrill and Smith recognize 
that “[e]asements have always been regarded as a type of property right.”248 
On the other hand, they say that “the exact significance of this appellation 
[is] . . . somewhat unclear,” and they recast the normative relations created 
by an easement as being “functionally like a contract in which an owner 
agrees to waive his or her right to exclude.”249 These tensions are under-
standable given Merrill and Smith’s starting premises. If one regards as a 
“basic principle . . . that property at its core entails the right to exclude oth-
ers from some discrete thing,”250 an easement seems not a property right but 
a borderline property right.251 Yet easements are focal instances property 
rights, and the concept introduced in Part V explains why. Even better, that 
concept also explains why and how easements differ from bare licenses.  
 Expressly-created easements and bare licenses are both created by 
grant from someone who owns land in fee simple. But these two legal ar-
rangements implicate different individual interests. Bare licenses do not 
seriously threaten the interests of neighbors, lenders, insurers, or people 
who do not yet own but might consider buying the license-grantor’s estate. 
Because such licenses are revocable, when a particular license threatens the 
interests of one of these third parties that party can press those interests 
against the grantor of the license. By contrast, because an easement is meant 
to be irrevocable, and irrevocable specifically throughout the community, it 
does implicate the interests of third parties. 
The use-facilitating concept introduced in the last Part explains why 
easements are property rights and bare licenses are not. Both interests per-
form the function of the concept introduced in the last Part. Both facilitate 
use by owners and non-owners. Indeed, the uses facilitated by easements 
and licenses facilitate social uses, of the sorts cherished by Progressive 
scholars.  
When fee simple ownership is legitimate, easements and bare licenses 
facilitate the use of land by non-owners. Both expressly-created easements 
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and licenses give non-owners familiar instruments in law by which to use 
land to which they might otherwise be denied access. And easements and 
bare licenses also facilitate the use of land by fee owners. Licenses and 
easements both give owners instruments by which to forge relations with 
neighbors. Or coordinate the activities of workers and business partners. Or 
earn rents or royalties in return for granting access to their lots. And because 
owners set the terms on which easements and licenses are granted, they en-
able owners to grant non-owners access on terms that do not threaten own-
ers’ core land uses. In the process, then, easements and licenses facilitate 
social interactions cherished by Progressive scholars. 
Although those use-interests justify creating two separate instruments 
in law and social morality, they justify only one property right consistent with 
the concept introduced in the last Part. When nonowners need secure and re-
liable access to an owner’s land, an easement supplies it to them. An ease-
ment supplies such access specifically by granting easement holders an in 
rem and immunized claim-right. Easements: consist of claim-rights protect-
ing their holders from interference with uses within their scopes;252 come 
with immunities protecting those claim-rights equitably from revocation;253 
and operate in rem.254 And these claim-rights facilitate easement-holders’ 
use of land. (Indeed, easements are sometimes called “uses,”255 and the term 
“easement” itself comes from the word aisement, an old French word for 
“use” or “enjoyment.”)256 But such claim-rights are also limited to protect 
the uses of fee owners of their lots. Easements are usufructs because they 
provide a reliable vehicle for protecting secondary uses by non-owners on 
terms consistent with owners’ primary uses of their lots. And because ease-
ments institute in rem rights, they implicate the interests of third parties. 
And those concerns justify formalities giving third parties adequate notice 
that easements exist. 
By contrast, licenses belong in property understood as a field of prac-
tice without being property in the sense on which we have focused through-
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perma.cc/8R4A-K8EL]. 
 256 See Easement, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.
php?term=easement [https://perma.cc/RR5Q-P7ZS]. 
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out this Article. Licenses belong in an encompassing field of property be-
cause they constitute one of the ways in which an owner can exercise her 
rights of ownership. Yet bare licenses are not property rights. Licenses do 
not include immunities because they are revocable. They are not in rem be-
cause they obligate only if and to the extent that the owners granting licens-
es decide not to revoke them. 
Although there are exceptional cases, they also confirm the basic dis-
tinctions described here. Exceptional cases arise when a licensee argues that 
the license-granting owner has induced reliance making the license irrevo-
cable by estoppel. When courts determine that a license should be irrevoca-
ble, it is not clear whether or not the license is a property right, and if so 
why or why not.257 Irrevocable licenses fall at the borders of being property 
rights. Such licenses possess the immunities necessary for property rights. 
But courts are somewhat conflicted on whether estoppel licenses bind third 
parties and on whether their burdens and benefits run with ownership of the 
relevant dominant and servient estates.258 
Because of these conflicts, irrevocable licenses may not be property 
rights, and if they are they seem odd or borderline property rights. And the 
account provided here explains why. Formally, if a court holds that a li-
cense-granting owner should be estopped from revoking the license, it 
doesn’t obviously follow that the judgment of estoppel ought to be enforced 
in rem beyond the licensee and the owner. And these formal deficiencies 
express in shorthand important functional concerns. Black-letter estoppel 
doctrine focuses on the behavior of the parties involved: did one party do or 
say things justifiably to induce another to expect that a specific state of af-
fairs would stay the same way?259 By contrast, property law and policy fo-
cus primarily on a different question: does one person’s claim of priority in 
use seem structured to be consistent with the use-claims of everyone else in 
the community? When we view estoppel licenses as dubious property 
rights, our intuitions carry into effect our expectations that estoppel and 
property doctrines accomplish different goals. 
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C. Running Covenants (and “Mere” Promises About Land Use) 
As the last Section explained, Merrill and Smith portray all servitudes 
as “[c]ontracts that bind successors in ownership.”260 And when they focus 
specifically on running covenants, they say that such covenants are “less 
‘property like’ than easements and lie closer to the contract end of the prop-
erty-contract spectrum.”261 Yet running covenants constitute property rights 
just as easements do. And if we understand why, we will appreciate even 
better how property concepts order private law. The last Section showed 
how property concepts help lay people and lawyers maintain familiar dis-
tinctions between in personam, revocable permissions for entry and in rem 
rights of entry. If we understand how land-related contracts and running cov-
enants differ from one another, we’ll understand how property concepts order 
legal relations at the interface of property and contract.262  
A running covenant constitutes a property-based solution to problems 
left unresolved by contract concepts. If there were no doctrine for running 
covenants, neighboring landowners could only restrain one another’s land 
uses by contract. Normally, rights in contract run in personam, and contrac-
tual obligations are usually not enforced as strictly as property rights are.263 
In most circumstances, both of these legal presumptions make practical 
sense. Because contractual promises involve two or more parties, changes 
in circumstances can make it unexpectedly harder for one or both parties to 
perform than either side anticipated at contract formation. To be sure, such 
changes do not justify releasing parties from their contracts. But such 
changes can and often do justify limiting the remedies available for breach 
of contract. 
But this contract-based template may not satisfy the wishes of people 
who live in a common development. When people buy into a development, 
they often want assurances that the neighborhood will not change. Because 
contractual obligations run in personam, ordinary contracts bind only par-
ties to those contracts and not the successors who acquire lots from the par-
ties who sign those contracts. And because it is relatively difficult to get 
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specific performance of a contract, parties to a development restriction 
could not be totally assured that the restriction would be enforced if it were 
guaranteed only by an ordinary contract. 
Running covenants overcome these problems. And they do so by con-
verting land use-related contractual obligations into proprietary obliga-
tions.264 And once again, when the concept under study guides the conver-
sion of contractual obligations into covenants, it facilitates social interac-
tions of the type cherished in Progressive scholarship. 
Concepts for contracts and property supply different normative guid-
ance to obligations. When contract law makes promises enforceable, it fo-
cuses on the interests of the promisors. By contrast, property law focuses 
more on whether it seems desirable for the land uses covered by a covenant 
to be enforced after the parties who made the promised have relinquished 
their rights in the lots covered. As a result, property law abstracts from the 
specific parties who entered into the contract. It focuses instead on hypo-
thetically-reasonable successors to the interests of the original covenanting 
parties. And since property rights institute in rem obligations, property law 
focuses more than contract law does on the effects of obligations on people 
who are not parties to the contract. 
With that background, we can understand why and how running cove-
nants constitute property rights. Running covenants facilitate use in the 
sense explained in Section V.A. Lehavi disagrees; he argues that a running 
covenant “seeks to secure or prevent a certain use” but does not enhance 
“the use of the asset.”265 Here, however, Lehavi assumes that use is the kind 
of use by which someone uses scissors to cut paper; he does not consider 
the possibility that use encompasses all purposeful and beneficial engage-
ment with a resource. Yet an owner can derive rational gratification from liv-
ing in a community designed in an artistic style he finds beautiful. An owner 
can also derive rational gratification from living in a community that is orga-
nized around a common plan of development. Historical sites, works by 
famous architects, and other landmarks can give a neighborhood a distinct 
character. An owner can derive rational gratification from living in a com-
munity with such a character. When someone deploys land to pursue one or 
more of these sources of gratification, she deploys the land for a use in this 
Article’s terms. To be sure, these uses are more passive than the uses one 
makes of land by growing crops on it or living on it. Nevertheless, use en-
compasses all purposeful and beneficial activity. Use covers not only active 
                                                                                                                           
 264 See Claeys, supra note 16, at 250–53. 
 265 LEHAVI, supra note 11, at 49; accord Merrill, The Right to Exclude II, supra note 37, at 4–
5. 
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deployment or consumption but also passive enjoyment. More specifically, 
use encompasses (consistent with Progressive goals) enjoyment of a neigh-
borhood maintained to encourage social interaction in a neighborhood made 
a community by owners’ coordinated land uses. 
While we are considering whether running covenants facilitate the use 
of covered land, we need to reason practically. And practical reasoning con-
siders not only the ways in which covenants might facilitate land use but 
also the ways in which it might restrict land use. Two concerns stand out. 
For prospective residents in a community, the main danger of a covenant is 
that it restricts their land uses. But that danger seems easy enough to 
avoid—with freedom of contract, notice requirements, and privity require-
ments. Since running covenants need to be opted into, any owner who buys 
into a neighborhood subject to such covenants believes that they have the 
“practical effect . . . to benefit the burdened land.”266 As long as prospective 
buyers have notice of covenants, they can decide for themselves whether 
they think they derive more use from the passive uses that covenants facili-
tate than the more active uses they restrict.  
Since use is only justifiable when it is sociable, however, we need to 
consider also the effects of covenants on everyone outside the development 
covered by them. Running covenants create several concerns for the com-
munity at large. Such covenants may ossify land use; in the course of lock-
ing in land uses popular in the short term, they may make it harder for 
neighborhoods to keep up with changing tastes in the long term. Running 
covenants may also deny prospective buyers effective access to land; they 
may lock land into uses favored by some and render it inaccessible to oth-
ers.267 Yet concerns like these do not undermine the case for running cove-
nants. Such concerns require communities and their leaders to exercise fur-
ther practical reason. Such concerns could justify limitations on the scope or 
duration of such covenants. The ossification problem can be addressed by a 
defense for termination in light of neighborhood change, and land-
distribution problems can be addressed by public policy limitations. 
When the concerns just described do not undermine running cove-
nants, such covenants can enhance the use of land. When it does, the use-
facilitating concept introduced in the last Part supplies a rough and ready 
formal strategy for enhancing such use. That concept focuses lawyers and 
decision-makers on an important question: when a person makes a promise 
involving the use of land, should the obligations that arise be regulated by 
rules of thumb and categories associated with interpersonal promises or 
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with land? Running covenant doctrine addresses that question. To make 
clear that a land-related promise belongs more in property law than in con-
tract law, it must be intended to run with the land, and it must also touch 
and concern the affected lots.268 The intent to run requirement ensures that 
the parties subjectively prefer that the obligations remain not in their per-
sonal capacities but instead run with ownership of the relevant land. The 
touch and concern requirement ensures that the substance of the promise 
seems objectively to relate not to the promisors but instead to the future use 
and enjoyment of the land affected.269  
Once a land-related promise seems a fitting candidate for a property 
right, the concept under study identifies the formal features that need to be 
added to the promise. An ordinary contractual promise constitutes a claim-
right. Running covenant doctrine adds to that promise an immunity, because 
the holder of a running covenant is entitled to equitable protection stronger 
than the protection provided by contract law.270 And since running cove-
nants are conceived of as obligations held by people in their capacities as 
the owners of the subject estates, it makes perfect sense that these immun-
ized claim-rights are in rem rights.271 And to facilitate the kinds of land uses 
that running covenants promote, running covenant doctrine confers onto 
these proprietary rights institutional status. That status signals to neighbors 
that they are bound to common land uses not by contract but by more bind-
ing principles of property law. 
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D. Mortgages 
The last Section showed how contract and property concepts differen-
tiate the domains of contract and property. The principles at work in the last 
Section apply with equal force to mortgages. Functionally, a mortgage ad-
dresses a pre-commitment problem in contract law. The solution is to give 
parties a more credible pre-commitment device—via a property right. 
At bottom, a mortgage constitutes a security interest for “performance 
of some obligation.”272 The lender/mortgagee has a preexisting claim-right 
to performance of the obligation. The mortgage “authorizes the lend-
er[/mortgagee] to arrange for the sale of the [mortgaged] property if the bor-
rower defaults on the loan . . . to recover the unpaid debt.”273 
These legal rights can perform the use-facilitating function recounted 
in Section V.A. Lehavi objects to this suggestion as well; he argues that a 
mortgage neither helps its holder use the resource nor exercise broad mana-
gerial authority to determine that resource’s uses.274 Yet mortgages give 
owners a new way to use their assets—as collateral expanding their borrow-
ing power. Since expanded borrowing capacity expands the range of rea-
sonably-gratifying life goals they can pursue, the use of an asset as collat-
eral constitutes use in the purposeful and beneficial sense explained in Sec-
tion V.A. Relatedly, mortgages facilitate the use of mortgaged resources by 
lenders—by empowering them to secure their loans more effectively than 
they could have in the absence of collateral. Of course, mortgages implicate 
use-interests in a third class of stake-holders, namely the third parties 
threatened by fragmentation or hidden encumbrances on property rights. 
But these concerns can be mitigated by appropriate doctrines—especially 
formalities rules notifying third parties that properties have mortgages on 
them. 
Then, in the parameters in which mortgages seem likely to perform the 
function attributed to property rights, the concept introduced here supplies a 
template for performing that function. Because the collateral for a mortgage 
constitutes a separable resource, laypeople and lawyers may reasonably ex-
pect law and social morality to create proprietary obligations with it. And a 
mortgage constitutes such a proprietary obligation—because it constitutes 
an in rem and immunized claim-right.  
The most important Hohfeldian relation created by a mortgage is a 
power, to foreclose upon default. But that power is protected by a claim-
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right not to be interfered with in the exercise of the power of foreclosure.275 
This claim-right is in turn reinforced by an immunity. When parties agree to 
a mortgage in a free bargain and the borrower/mortgagor defaults, the lend-
er/mortgagee is entitled to foreclose. Although courts do consider equitable 
undue hardship arguments, those arguments constitute exceptions to a more 
basic rule. Ordinarily, “the role of the . . . court is to enforce the agreement 
between the parties [and] . . . not . . . intrude its substantive judgment as to 
whether or not the terms of that agreement were too severe,”276 and that rule 
entitles a mortgagee to an immunized claim-right. And the power, claim-
right, and immunity all obligate in rem, as is shown by the fact that mort-
gages remain enforceable even when the mortgaged assets are trans-
ferred.277 And when a mortgage is recognized as a distinct and legitimate 
instrument in lending law, it acquires institutional status and performs the 
function expected of property. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
I have now completed the case study I promised to conduct. That study 
supplies an account of one particular property concept, prominent in Anglo-
American common law. The intension of that concept can be delineated: In 
its focal sense, a property right refers to an in rem and immunized claim-
right; given institutional status in law and social morality; in relation to a 
separable resource; to facilitate the productive, beneficial, and sociable use 
of that resource and other resources commonly proximate to it. Further 
study will need to be conducted to see whether this concept applies uni-
formly throughout Anglo-American law, whether in common law or be-
yond. But the concept does extend coherently to water rights and to four 
property doctrines frequently cited to show that property rights lack regular 
conceptual structure. 
I hope that the foregoing study highlights the strengths and limitations 
of the conceptual views most prominent in contemporary property scholar-
ship. Bundle methods are most helpful when delineating the precise obliga-
tions generated by property rights in specific recurring act-situations. Such 
views, however, also suggest that property concepts do not organize peo-
ple’s dealings with rights in resources in recurring situations. That sugges-
tion seems wrong. Revocable licenses and contracts restricting land use re-
late to things, but they are not property rights, and bundle views cannot ex-
plain why. Easements and legal interests in cotenancies are property rights, 
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and property concepts shape our judgments to this effect. Yet bundle views 
cannot account for these judgments—even though these doctrines have 
been cited as doctrines confirming bundle views. Scholars who favor bun-
dle views need to clarify further why property can only be accounted for as 
a bundle of thing-related jural relations. 
This Article has confirmed what it suggested at the outset about the 
castle metaphor and exclusion views. Not that the point needed confirming, 
but property rights come in many varieties besides rights as sweeping as the 
authority a lord enjoys over a castle. Leading exclusion views recognize as 
much, but this Article has identified other limits that apply even to careful-
ly-specified exclusion views. Exclusion views are extremely valuable for 
studying ownership—as associated with land, chattels, or wealth. But own-
ership is not the only general concept influential in property law. Because 
exclusion views focus on ownership, they necessarily abstract from nonpos-
sessory property rights and property law interests that (like revocable li-
censes) are not property rights. The concept and the methods introduced 
here offer a different perspective on those rights and relations. This concept 
and methods help us appreciate better: why easements and running cove-
nants are property rights; why revocable licenses and contractual land-use 
restrictions are not such rights; and why normative goals associated with 
property might be furthered by regarding concurrent estates and nonposses-
sory rights even though they confer less authority than fees simple do. 
This Article has also offered what I hope are helpful guides for further 
studies in Progressive property. It seems unproductive to argue that exclu-
sive ownership is the only or the dominant institution for property in Anglo-
American law. As this Article has shown, Anglo-American law seems to 
operate via at least two complementary general concepts: one for owner-
ship, and another for property rights including not only ownership rights but 
also concurrent and nonpossessory rights. That latter concept of property 
needs to be studied far more than it has been to date. And in such studies, 
scholars who sympathize with the themes of Progressive property scholar-
ship should consider whether property concepts can possess social func-
tions. Of course, the particular concept studied in this Article is only one of 
many concepts that could be instituted to facilitate Progressive goals toward 
resource distribution and use. Different particular concepts could incorpo-
rate functions different from the ones in the concept introduced here. By the 
same token, different concepts may apply to classes of resources, and insti-
tute jural rights, different from the classes and rights applied by the use-
facilitating concept studied here. Even with those qualifications, however, I 
hope that this Article’s case study has performed a valuable service. Even if 
Progressive scholars find unsatisfying some of the specific elements in the 
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concept studied in this Article, they may accept that property concepts must 
possess some features corresponding to those elements.  
I also hope that all of the foregoing lessons provoke property theorists 
to explore further this Article’s two suggestions. Scholars need to consider 
far more seriously than has been done to date the possibility that there exists 
a general concept covering property rights weaker than ownership rights. 
Analytically, can other particular concepts, arising from different normative 
justifications for property, represent property rights like water rights, servi-
tudes, and legal cotenancy interests? This Article focused on common law 
property rights for ease of exposition. Analytically, what happens when one 
resource in real life is subject to conflicting property concepts and re-
gimes—in common law, in statutes or regulations authorized by statutes, 
and possibly in constitutional protections as well? Normatively, most of the 
heat in contemporary property scholarship comes from defenses for and 
critiques of ownership property. More light needs to be shed on how differ-
ent normative justifications for property apply to rights like the limited, in 
rem and immunized claim-right traced in this Article. 
I also hope that the foregoing case study confirms this Article’s second 
suggestion: at least some and maybe all concepts of property possess arti-
fact functions. This suggestion also deserves further study. Do any particu-
lar concepts of property rights lack an artifact function? As this Article rec-
ognized, the function central in the concept studied here is just one of many 
possible functions around which property concepts might be organized. For 
similar reasons, different concepts of property may possess different fea-
tures because they perform different functions. But around what specific 
functions are other extant concepts organized? How might the coverage of 
property and the jural relations it protects vary with the functions it makes 
central? In addition, as Section IV.E stressed, to be morally legitimate a 
property concept needs to serve the reason-based interests of the people 
who accept the concept. If other concepts of property possess different 
functions, do those functions supply the relevant concepts with legitimate 
authority, and if so how? 
In case it needs saying, this Conclusion has raised more questions than 
this Article has answered. But one of the Article’s main suggestions is that 
current debates about property concepts need further clarification and better 
direction. This Article’s lessons should help clarify what prominent views 
on property need to do to engage with one another. Those lessons should 
also help delineate the most important aspects of property concepts. I will 
be satisfied if I have convinced readers that projects like these need to be 
pursued in further conceptual studies of property. 
